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INCORPORATING THE SUSPENSION
CLAUSE: IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
FOR STATE PRISONERS?
Jordan Steiker*
INTRODUCTION

In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court adopted generous standards
governing federal habeas petitions by state prisoners. 1 At that time,
the Court suggested, rather surprisingly, that its solicitude toward
such petitions might be constitutionally mandated by the Suspension
Clause,2 the only provision in the Constitution that explicitly refers to
the "Writ of Habeas Corpus." 3 Now, thirty years later, the Court has
essentially overruled those expansive rulings, 4 and Congress has con* Assistant Professor, University of Texas Law School. B.A. 1984, Wesleyan; J.D. 1988,
Harvard. - Ed. I would like to thank Hans Baade, Sam lssacharoff, Sandy Levinson, Dick
Markovits, Scot Powe, and Carol Steiker for their comments on an earlier draft.
1. See, e.g.. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I (1963) {formulating standard for addressing
"new-claim" successive petitions by either federal or state prisoners); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963) (adopting "deliberate bypass" standard to govern habeas court decision regarding
enforcement of state procedural default); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (outlining
circumstances under which state petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on federal
habeas).
2. "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
3. See. e.g.. Sanders, 373 U.S. at 11-12 ("[I]f construed to derogate from the traditional
liberality of the writ of habeas corpus,§ 2244 [governing both state and federal prisoners] might
raise serious constitutional questions.") (citing the Suspension Clause); Noia, 372 U.S. at 406
("We need not pause to consider whether it was the Framers' understanding that congressional
refusal to permit the federal courts to accord the writ its full common-law scope as we have
described it might constitute an unconstitutional suspension of the privilege of the writ. There
have been some intimations of support for such a proposition in decisions of this Court.")
(citations omitted); Townsend, 372 U.S. at 311 ("We pointed out there that the historic
conception of the writ, anchored in the ancient common law and in our Constitution as an
efficacious and imperative remedy for detentions of fundamental illegality, has remained constant
to the present day.") (citing Noia); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963) ("The habeas
corpus jurisdictional statute implements the constitutional command that the writ of habeas
corpus be made available.") (citing the Suspension Clause).
4. See, e.g.. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992) (overruling Tow11se11d, 372
U.S. at 313, by requiring a showing of cause and prejudice to excuse failure to develop facts
underlying claim in state court proceedings); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (petitioner
must show "cause and prejudice" to excuse failure to raise new claims in prior petition);
Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (applying "cause and prejudice" test, rather than
"deliberate bypass" standard, to determine whether to enforce state procedural forfeiture):
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (plurality opinion) (requiring a "colorable showing of
factual innocence" to overcome bar against claims which raise grounds identical to grounds
heard and decided on the merits in a previous petition).
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sidered, though not yet enacted, further limitations on the availability
of the writ. 5 Despite these significant assaults on the habeas forum,
the constitutional argument appears to have been entirely abandoned.
The liberal minority on the Court has not mentioned the Suspension
Clause in over a decade, and legislative as well as academic supporters
of habeas have scarcely alluded to the Constitution as a bulwark
against the writ's further demise. 6
The question, then, is whether the constitutional claim that surfaced briefly to support the writ's unparalleled expansion during the
1960s is as much of an embarrassment as its total disappearance would
suggest. I will argue that the claim is far from an embarrassment and,
indeed, draws support from a variety of familiar forms of constitutional argument, including history, text, doctrine, and structure. 7
Before elaborating the affirmative case, though, I will set forth the
"doubts" that most likely account for the absence of any sustained
effort to defend a constitutional right to federal habeas for state
prisoners.
The first and most obvious response to the claimed "constitutional
right" of habeas corpus is that the current writ serves a far broader
purpose today than its counterpart at the time of the Founding. 8 By
5. See, e.g., S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1982) (advocating "full and fair" standard).
This proposal is discussed in Larry W. Yackle, The Reagan Administration's Habeas Corpus
Proposals, 68 IOWA L. REV. 609 (1983).
6. Twenty-five years ago, academics warned Congress that a bill withdrawing federal habeas
from state prisoners would violate the Constitution, and Congress's decision to abandon the
proposal rested largely on perceived constitutional limitations. See Francis Paschal, The
Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605, 606-07 (citing testimony).
7. See, e.g.. PHILIP BOBBIIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11-22 (1991) (discussing
modalities of constitutional argument); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory
of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194-1209 (1987) (discussing the role
of history, text, structure, doctrine, and values in constitutional interpretation).
8. See, e.g.. Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts - Constitutional Right or
Legislative Grace?, 40 CAL. L. REV. 335 (1952) (arguing that the scope of the writ is an issue
properly delegated to Congress); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, No11Retroactivity and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1779 n.244 (1991)
(maintaining that the Suspension Clause "is most plausibly understood as extending only to cases
of extrajudicial detention by federal authority, and thus does not guarantee a postconviction
remedy for state prisoners"); Henry J. Friendly, Is I1111oce11ce Irrelevant? Collateral Attack 011
Criminal Judgmellts, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 170 (1970) ("It can scarcely be doubted that the
writ protected by the suspension clause is the writ as known to the framers, not as Congress may
have chosen to expand it, or more pertinently, as the Supreme Court has interpreted what
Congress did.") (footnote omitted). Justice Harlan made this objection in his Sanders dissent:
I must also protest the implication in the Court's opinion that every decision of this Court in
the field of habeas corpus . . . has become enshrined in the Constitution because of the
guarantee in Article I against suspension of the writ. This matter may perhaps be brought
back into proper perspective by noting again that at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, and for many years afterward, a claim of the kind . . . asserted here by
petitioner [) was not cognizable in habeas corpus at all.
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 29 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Along the
same lines, see Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384-85 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (arguing
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1789 and at common law, habeas was primarily used to challenge unauthorized pretrial detentions; 9 today, habeas permits a court to test
the legality of a criminal conviction. Indeed, federal habeas currently
allows state prisoners to relitigate issues of federal law that state courts
have already addressed and decided on their merits. 10 From an
originalist perspective, then, to the extent that the Constitution protects any substantive form of the writ, it enshrines at most a limited
protection against indefinite confinement without the benefit of formal
charges or a speedy trial. On this view, the more encompassing collateral review authorized by the habeas statute is a matter of legislative
grace rather than constitutional command. 11
There are other, equally serious difficulties with asserting a constitutional right to federal habeas relief for state prisoners. As a preliminary matter, the peculiar phrasing of the Suspension Clause raises
doubts about whether the Clause affords prisoners even a qualified entitlement to habeas. The provision does not declare that a habeas remedy shall ordinarily be available to federal or state prisoners; in fact,
such a proposal was suggested but not adopted at the Constitutional
Convention. 12 Instead, the Clause merely specifies the circumstances
under which the privilege may be withdrawn. Accordingly, the
Clause might simply limit Congress's ability to abolish a judicial remedy that it is not elsewhere required to establish. 13 If, as Chief Justice
Marshall stated in his famous dictum in Ex parte Bollman, 14 federal
habeas jurisdiction exists only to the extent that Congress so provides,
the protection of the Suspension Clause would be quite minimal; abthat the Suspension Clause protects only the writ as known at the time of the Framers and
therefore imposes no requirement on Congress to provide any collateral review of convictions
entered by courts of competent jurisdiction).
9. See, e.g., Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States - 1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
243, 244-45 (1965):
At common law and under the famous Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 the use of the Great Writ
against official restraints was simply to ensure that a person was not held without formal
charges and that once charged he was either bailed or brought to trial within a specified
time.
10. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (holding that the habeas statute permits
federal courts to revisit substantive federal issues addressed on their merits in state court).
11. See supra sources cited in note 8.
12. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 438 (Max Farrand ed ..
1911) (reporting that Charles Pinkney of South Carolina "urg[ed] the propriety of securing the
benefit of the Habeas corpus in the most ample manner" and proposed that " 'it should not be
suspended but on the most urgent occasions, and then only for a limited time not exceeding
twelve months' "). This provision undoubtedly was intended for the benefit of federal prisoner~
alone.
13. See, e.g., William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875.
,13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333, 343 (1969) ("The Constitution did not set the bounds of the federal
courts' habeas powers; it dealt only with the reasons for suspending the writ.").
14. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94-95 (1807).
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sent congressional action, "the privilege itself would be lost, although
no law for its suspension should be enacted." 15
Moreover, there is some reason to believe that the Framers
designed the Suspension Clause principally to promote federalism to ensure that Congress would not interfere with the power of state
courts to afford habeas relief to federal prisoners. 16 On this understanding, the claim that state prisoners are constitutionally entitled to
a federal forum is not only wrong, but destructive of the Clause's original function; requiring federal review of state criminal convictions
weakens rather than strengthens state judicial power within the federal
structure.
Finally, even if the Framers initially intended the Clause to safeguard the power of federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus, they
certainly did not understand that power to extend to state prisoners.
Indeed, in its first effort to establish federal habeas jurisdiction, the
Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress emphatically limited habeas review to
prisoners in federal custody. 17 Over forty years later, in the wake of
states' resistance to federal taxes, Congress permitted federal courts to
issue writs for federal officers held in state custody. 18 But it was not
until 1867, more than three-quarters of a century after the Framers
adopted the Constitution and the First Congress gave life to the federal judiciary, that Congress chose to extend the writ generally to state
prisoners. 19 Given this history, a proponent of broad federal habeas
review of state criminal convictions faces seemingly insurmountable
obstacles in asserting a constitutional basis for such jurisdiction.
One final objection is worth noting. The federal habeas remedy is
significant today because it affords an opportunity for federal review of
15. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 95.
16. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 155 (1980)
(arguing that "the habeas clause was meant to restrict Congress from suspending state habeas for
federal prisoners except in certain cases where essential for public safety"). This view of the
Suspension Clause was rejected emphatically by the Court in Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 506 (1858), and again in Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871). For current
criticism of Duker's position, see Michael Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending Justice: Tlze
Unconstitutionality of the Proposed Six-Momh Time Limit on the Filing of Habeas Corpus
Petitions by State Death Row Inmates. 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 451, 465 (1990-1991)
(arguing that the word privilege in the Clause reveals the Framers' intent to establish a federal
writ).
17. After specifying that the federal courts shall have the power to issue habeas writs to
inquire into the cause of commitment, the First Judiciary Act added the following proviso:
That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they
are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed
for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to te~tify.
First Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 14, I Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789).
18. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634-35.
19. Judiciary Act, ch. 28, § I, 14 Stat. 385-86 (1867).
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virtually all federal issues arising in state criminal proceedings - an
opportunity that is, in the vast majority of cases, unavailable as a practical matter through the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction. Were
the lower federal courts not enlisted in the effort, federal habeas would
surely cease to exist as an effective remedy for state prisoners. It is
widely asserted, though, that the decision whether to divide the federal
judicial power between the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts remains wholly within Congress's discretion. 20 Under this
view, attributable to Henry Hart, 21 among others, Congress could
abolish the lower federal courts altogether. Accordingly, Congress
could vest whatever habeas jurisdiction is constitutionally required entirely in the Supreme Court. If this accepted wisdom about the "nonconstitutional" status of the lower federal courts is sound, then any
constitutional right to federal habeas for state prisoners would be
vastly different from the habeas that exists today. 22
The "original" Suspension Clause thus seems an unlikely source
for constitutionalizing current habeas practice regarding state prisoners. However, given that traditional notions of federalism have been
adjusted significantly over the past two hundred years, one may fairly
ask whether any constitutional development after the 1789 ratification
amplifies the limited protections secured by the Suspension Clause. If
the Suspension Clause had been placed within the Bill of Rights,
rather than Article I, the obvious source of such amplification would
be the Fourteenth Amendment. Over the past several decades, many
of the constraints on federal power contained in the Bill of Rights have
been "incorporated" through the Due Process Clause to safeguard individual liberty against state intrusion. 23 Should the Fourteenth
20. For a lucid discussion of this issue, -see Akhil R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article
/IL· Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 229-30 (1985)
(arguing for structural "parity" among the federal courts and embracing Henry Hart's view that
Congress "may - but need not" create Article III courts other than the Supreme Court); see
also Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 V1u. L.
REV. 1030, 1031 (1982) (arguing that the Constitution reflects "an agreement that the question
whether access to the lower federal courts was necessary to assure the effectivenes~ of federal law
should not be answered as a matter of constitutional principle, but rather, should be left a matter
of political and legislative judgment"); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power To Curtail Federal
Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN L. Ri:v. 895, 898
(1984) (maintaining broad congressional power "in terms of sheer legal authority").
21. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1363-64 (1953).
22. Justice Scalia recently made a similar argument in urging a restrictive reading of the
habeas statute. Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1770 (1993) (Scalia, J .• di~~enting)
(suggesting that the Framers' decision to make the establishment of lower federal court~
discretionary undermines the assertion that state courts are not full equals in adjudicating federal
issues).
23. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (applying the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial against the states); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (applying th.:
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Amendment likewise be read to "nationalize" a "right" originally conceived as a limitation on federal power notwithstanding its placement
in Article I? What would an "incorporated" Suspension Clause look
like?
Perhaps because the Suspension Clause has been a virtually empty
source of liberty for federal prisoners, the question of its incorporation
and application against the states has gone almost entirely unnoticed. 24 Or perhaps our doctrinal blinders have caused us to overlook
the liberty-protecting provisions of the "unamended" Constitution in
gauging the import of the Fourteenth Amendment. 25 Whatever the
reason, the failure to address whether habeas review for state prisoners
has been "constitutionalized" by the dramatic events of
Reconstruction seems particularly surprising in light of the striking
support for such a claim. After all, the "[P]rivileges or [I]mmunities"
Clause of Section 126 certainly could be read to extend the only "privilege" specified in the Constitution to those detained by state authorities, without the necessity of the more circuitous "incorporation"
route. Indeed, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment frequently
mentioned habeas as illustrative of the rights that would be newly safeguarded against state deprivation. 27 The virtually simultaneous conSixth Amendment right to a speedy and public trial against the states); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. l (1964) (applying the Fifth Amendment right to be free of compelled self-incrimination
against the states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (applying the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel against the states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment).
24. Writing just before the Court's widespread embrace of incorporation, Judge (then
Professor) Pollak acknowledged the possibility of incorporating the protections of the Suspension
Clause but dismissed the argument as unlikely to find a receptive audience in the Supreme Court.
Louis H. Pollak, Proposals To Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral
Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50, 64 (1956) ("Nor is it likely that the Court would
presently accept the rather elaborate argument that the Fourteenth Amendment retroactively
inflated the scope of the constitutional privilege to include the newly created federal rights to
protection against state action.").
A more recent article contends that proposed time limits on habeas filings by state prisoners
might run afoul of the Suspension Clause. See Mello & Duffy, supra note 16, at 470-72
(suggesting that an expansion of the Clause to encompass state prisoners is warranted by the
writ's flexible tradition). In a footnote, the authors maintain that such an expansion would be
analogous to the Court's incorporation decisions. Id. at 471 n.119.
25. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1131-37
(1991) (arguing that modern approaches to incorporation have caused us to misapprehend the
mix of structural and individual liberty protections in both the original Constitution and the Bill
of Rights).
26. "No State shall make or enforce any Jaw which shall abridge the privileges or ii:nmunities
of citizens of the United States .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l.
·
27. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., lst Sess. 475, 499, 1117, 1263, 2765 (1866). Virtually all of
the references to habeas corpus stem from the repeated invocation of Justice Washington's
opinion in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230), listing some
of "those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental." For a brief
discussion, see Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. 101 YALE L.J.
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gressional drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment and decision to
extend federal habeas review to state prisoners may not, in the end, be
merely coincidental.
The fundamental claim in this article is that the Suspension Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment together are best read to mandate
federal habeas review of the convictions of state prisoners. The constitutional requirement does not flow from the fact that postconviction
review of criminal sentences is a fundamental right or privilege of national citizenship. Indeed, federal prisoners cannot reasonably claim a
constitutional right to such review. Rather, the argument rests on the
importance of federal review of constitutional questions to the
supremacy and enforcement of federal law. Even before the Civil
War, the federal writ of habeas corpus had become an essential means
of assuring full vindication of federal interests. Later, in the early
years of Reconstruction, Congress recognized that writ-of-error review
of state criminal convictions by the Supreme Court was inadequate to
ensure states' compliance with federal law. Accordingly, Congress
radically expanded federal jurisdiction to encompass federal habeas review of all persons detained in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States. This article will assert that the Fourteenth
Amendment constitutionalized this supremacy-ensuring role of the
federal courts such that Congress is obligated to make federal review
of state criminal convictions practically available through federal
habeas corpus.
Of course, the fact that the Reconstruction Congress may have regarded federal habeas as important to assuring states' compliance with
federal law does not by itself suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment
elevated federal habeas review of state convictions to constitutional
status. The affirmative case relies on a variety of evidence: the history
of habeas corpus in the United States prior to the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the textual support for constitutionalizing
habeas in the Suspension Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court's doctrinal approach to discerning "nationalized" rights in the
Fourteenth Amendment, and overarching considerations of constitutional structure. None of these arguments alone "clinches" the case
for recognizing a constitutional right to federal habeas review for state
prisoners. Together, though, they provide a convincing basis for the
Court's unexamined and hence unsupported intuition thirty years ago
that wholesale withdrawal of federal habeas review of state convictions
would raise serious constitutional questions.
1193, 1228 n.161 (1992) (discussing references to habeas in the debates surrounding lhc
Fourteenth Amendment).

February 1994]

Incorporating the Suspension Clause

869

Part I of the article briefly examines the historiography surrounding the "original" Suspension Clause and then traces the actual history
of the writ in this country before the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The early history of habeas corpus illustrates that, even
before the Civil War, the federal writ had become an important mechanism for ensuring the supremacy offederal law. The statutory expansions of the writ between 1789 and 1867 were all aimed at specific
challenges to federal supremacy. In addition, the history reveals that
the scope of the writ during this period was not uniformly limited to
review of pretrial detentions or, in the case of actions brought by persons already convicted, to the jurisdiction of the convicting court.
Rather, the writ provided a mechanism in certain cases for reviewing
postconviction constitutional questions. Overall, the early history of
the writ reveals the well-established connection between federal habeas
and the supremacy of federal law, and it refutes the long-standing objection that the function of the writ at the time of the "Founding" was
importantly different from the function of the writ today.
Part II of the article examines the textual case for recognizing a
constitutional right to habeas corpus. At first blush, the case seems
strong. The Constitution itself describes the writ of habeas corpus as a
"privilege," and the Fourteenth Amendment protects "privileges or
immunities" from state abridgment. On this view, the case for expanding and transforming the constitutional protection of habeas in
light of the Fourteenth Amendment appears at least as strong as the
case for "incorporating" the various liberty-protecting provisions of
the Bill of Rights. But the argument so cast does not suggest that the
federal government must make habeas available; it suggests only that
states must make the writ available in their own courts, or perhaps
refrain from interfering with the federal exercise of the writ. Hence,
the text supports only the limited proposition that the Fourteenth
Amendment constitutionalizes some aspect of the habeas right protected by the Suspension Clause. A separate, nontextual argument
must make the case for reading the Fourteenth Amendment to require
federal action, and not merely to prohibit states' action, with respect
to the writ.
Part III examines the Court's doctrinal approach to identifying
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's incorporation methodology focuses on whether a purported right is rooted in
a specific textual commitment in the Constitution and whether such a
right is fairly regarded as "fundamental" in our traditions. This approach supports the claim that the "right" to habeas corpus embodied
in the Suspension Clause should be "incorporated" through the
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Fourteenth Amendment. Part III also examines how the incorporated
habeas right should be reconstructed. The original Constitution
clearly vests the judicial power to review federal questions in the fed·
eral courts. 28 The question is whether the Fourteenth Amendment
should be read to extend this requirement such that federal review of
constitutional questions is not merely possible, through discretionary
review, but available as a matter of right to state prisoners. This Part
concludes that historical considerations, as well as contemporary
habeas practices and prevailing constitutional doctrine, suggest that
the Fourteenth Amendment habeas right requires Congress to afford
some meaningful, nondiscretionary jurisdictional vehicle for federal
review of federal constitutional claims raised by state prisoners. In
addition, this Part briefly addresses the potential objection that
Congress's constitutionally protected discretion to abolish the lower
federal courts includes the lesser power to vest habeas jurisdiction entirely within the Supreme Court.
Finally, Part IV examines how the asserted constitutional right
would bear on current controversies regarding the scope of habeas
corpus for state prisoners. In particular, this Part examines whether
the various Court-driven habeas reforms and proposed congressional
restrictions on the writ run afoul of a Fourteenth Amendment right to
federal habeas corpus.
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND COMMON LAW
HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS BEFORE THE
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT

When the Thirty-ninth Congress drafted the Fourteenth
Amendment, the writ of habeas corpus had a significant history in this
country independent of its English origins. By 1868, the Supreme
Court had already reached some tentative conclusions regarding the
scope of the Suspension Clause. 29 Congress had enacted several provisions conferring habeas powers on the federal courts, 30 and federal and
state habeas practice illuminated the range of purposes to which the
writ could be put. 31 This history confirms that the American writ oc28. See Amar, supra note 20, at 209 (arguing that, in cases involving federal questions,
"federal jurisdiction is mandatory [and] the power to hear all such cases must be vested in the
federal judiciary as a whole").
29. See infra section I.B.1.
30. See infra sections I.B.1 & I.B.3 (discussing statutes).
31. See infra sections l.B.2 & I.B.4.
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cupied a different position from its English counterpart's. 32 In this
country, the federal writ provided an important jurisdictional means
of protecting national interests. Moreover, the writ's availability to
challenge certain constitutional questions during this period undermines the contention that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
had a specific or rigid conception of the writ's proper scope. Ultimately, then, the history suggests that, when the framers spoke of
habeas as a "privilege or immunity" of citizenship, the privilege to
which they referred had substantially different content from the purportedly narrow English writ that had been imported to this country
centuries before.
A. Historiography of the Original Suspension Clause

The underlying purpose of the Suspension Clause is widely debated. The Clause is located in Section 9 of Article I, which is structurally similar to the Bill of Rights. Like the Bill, Section 9 seeks to
safeguard individual liberty both directly, by proscribing certain kinds
of offensive lawmaking, and indirectly, by calibrating power between
the federal government and the states. Some of the "pure" individual
liberty provisions, such as the prohibition of Bills of Attainder and ex
post facto laws, 33 also appear in Section 10, which enumerates limitations on states' power. 34 Several other provisions, such as the qualified
prohibition of the regulation of the slave trade35 and the limitation on
the taxation of states' exports, 36 withhold powers that might otherwise
have been thought to fall within Congress's enumerated powers under
Section 8. 37
The placement of the Suspension Clause within Section 9 makes
indisputably clear the Framers' intent to limit federal interference
with the writ. All of Section 9 is directed toward federal, almost ex32. See infra section I.C.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed."}.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post
facto Law ....").
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of
the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior
to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.").
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from
any State.").
37. Congressional power to regulate the slave trade might otherwise have been thought to be
an incident of Congress's commerce power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The power to tax
states' exports might have been located in a combination of the Commerce Clause and the
Taxation Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises ....").
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elusively congressional, 38 action. The more puzzling questions concern whose habeas power - federal or state - the Clause protects and
to what extent.
On one view, the Framers sought to protect the power of the federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus for federal prisoners. 39 A
strong version of this position asserts that the Suspension Clause itself
obligates Congress to vest habeas powers in some federal court because the prohibition against suspension presumes an existing power. 40
A slightly different version of this position maintains that federal
courts, once created, cannot be deprived of habeas jurisdiction over
federal prisoners.41 The general thrust of these positions is that the
Suspension Clause requires the federal judiciary to provide a check
against potential abuses of federal power.
On an emerging alternative view, the Framers designed the
Suspension Clause to protect the power of state courts to inquire into
the detentions offederal prisoners.42 Hence, the "existing" power protected by the Suspension Clause lies within state statutory, common
law, and constitutional provisions that had already established habeas
jurisdiction in the state courts. 43 In rejecting the more established
38. The restriction on drawing unappropriated funds from the treasury, U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law ...."), and the prohibition against granting titles of nobility, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 8 ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States ...• "),seem to run against
the Executive as well as against Congress.
Substantial controversy remains concerning whether the limited suspension power belongs to
Congress, the Executive, or some combination of the two. Lincoln's suspension of the writ in
certain areas during the Civil War was followed over a year later by Congress's blanket
authorization to suspend the writ "during the present rebellion ... whenever, in [the President's]
judgment, the public safety may require it .... " Habeas Corpus Act, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755
(1863) (expiration recognized in 1866). Before the congressional authorization, there were
several challenges to the refusal of executive officials to respond to the writ. In the most famous
episode, the military commander at Fort McHenry refused to produce John Merryman, who was
accused of assisting in the effort to destroy railroad bridges in Baltimore. Chief Justice Taney
issued an opinion stating that the military officer had a constitutional obligation to respond to the
writ and that the President Jacked power to authorize suspension. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F.
Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). Justice Taney's order was ignored. All subsequent
suspensions of the writ in our history, most notably the suspension of the writ in Hawaii during
World War II, Developments in the Law - Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038,
1265 (1970) [hereinafter Developments], have been at Congress's direction.
39. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 38, at 1267 ("The framers' decision to single out
habeas corpus for particular protection against congressional 'suspension' suggests that they
assumed that habeas jurisdiction would exist in some court for federal prisoners.").
40. This view is often attributed to Chief Justice Marshall on the basis of his opinion in Ex
parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). See DUKER, supra note 16, at 126; Paschal, supra
note 6, at 605.
41. Developments, supra note 38, at 1272.
42. See DUKER, supra note 16, at 126-56 (defending the position that Suspension Clause was
originally designed to prevent congressional abridgment of state habeas remedies); Akhil R.
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1509 (1987) (agreeing with Duker).
43. DUKER, supra note 16, at 140. Four of the 12 states with written constitutions at the
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view, advocates of this position emphasize the fact that Article III
does not require the creation of lower federal courts;44 a defender of
the "obligation" theory must accept that Congress could place the federal habeas power entirely within the Supreme Court and, accordingly, that Congress could ensure that the Suspension Clause would
provide quite limited protection against unlawful detentions. A moderating position that relies extensively on an intricate parsing of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 suggests that the Suspension Clause requires
both state and federal courts to make the writ available to federal
prisoners.45
Assuming that the Framers intended the Suspension Clause to
safeguard some form of the writ, what did they understand habeas
review to encompass? The variance in state habeas practices after the
adoption of the Constitution46 suggests that there was no uniform conception of the writ's function. Most judges and academics have insisted that habeas review at the time of the Constitution's ratification
was strictly limited to the lawfulness of extrajudicial detentions and, in
the case of persons already convicted, to the general jurisdiction of the
court of conviction.47 Of course the rhetoric surrounding the function
and scope of habeas corpus has been, and continues to be, much
broader.48 Moreover, the history of the writ in England was quite
malleable, leading one prominent scholar to argue that the Framers,
time of the constitutional convention affirmatively guaranteed the right to habeas corpus. See
N.C. CONST. of 1776, dee!. of rights, § 13; GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LX; MASS. CONST. of 1780,
ch. 6, art. VII; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. l, art. XV. Three states, in addition to Georgia and
Massachusetts, had enacted statutory provisions modeled on the English Habeas Corpus Act of
1679. See Oaks, supra note 9, at 251 (citing New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia provisions).
Many of the states afforded some common law version of the writ. Id. at 248-49.
44. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ l ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.").
45. Paschal, supra note 6, at 607.
46. See Oaks, supra note 9, at 258-64 (discussing state habeas practices).
47. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
48. Blackstone described habeas as "the most celebrated writ in the English law," and habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum (the precursor to the present-day writ) as "the great and efficacious writ,
in all manner of illegal confinement." 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129, *131;
see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 405 (1963) ("[A]t the time that the Suspension Clause was
written into our Federal Constitution and the first Judiciary Act was passed conferring habeas
corpus jurisdiction upon the federal judiciary, there was respectable common-law authority for
the proposition that habeas was available to remedy any kind of governmental restraint contrary
to fundamental law."); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1942) (maintaining that the writ
"extends . . . to those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the
constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of preserving
his rights") (citations omitted); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("[H]abeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure.
It comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the proceedings, and although every form
may have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they have been more than an empty shell.");
Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, 1923 App. Cas. 603, 609 (Earl of Birkenhead)
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aware of the writ's past evolution, intended to enshrine a similarly
malleable mechanism for vindicating claims of individual liberty. 49
The competing accounts about the design and expected reach of
the Suspension Clause are of obvious interest to anyone who embraces
intentionalist arguments about the meaning of the Constitution. But
such accounts shed light only on the "original" Suspension Clause.
To the extent that intentionalism can shed light on whether and how
courts should apply the Suspension Clause against the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, the focus must be on the understanding
of the Suspension Clause by the framers and ratifiers of that
Amendment. By the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, a
significant body of caselaw had addressed the constitutional status of
habeas corpus. In addition, practical experience with the writ in federal and state litigation undoubtedly informed the Reconstruction
Congress's understanding of the function of habeas corpus. It is
against that backdrop that the role of habeas corpus in the reconstructed constitutional order should be evaluated.
B. Habeas Decisions Between the Founding and the Civil War

1. Ex Parte Bollman: The Court's First Word on the Suspension
Clause and the Judiciary Act
Congress first established federal habeas jurisdiction in the
Judiciary Act of 1789. Section 14 of the Act mentions writs of habeas
corpus in two separate contexts. so First, it empowers all federal courts
- the Supreme Court and the newly created lower federal courts - to
issue writs, including habeas corpus.st Second, "the justices of the
supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have
power to grant writs of habeas corpus, for the purpose of an inquiry
("[H]abeas corpus ... afford[s] a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or
confinement.").
49. Professor Freund developed this position as an advocate. See Brief for Respondent at 30·
39, United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) (No. 23). The case concerned the adequacy of
the federal postconviction remedies in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) in lieu of habeas corpus
proceedings for federal prisoners.
50. Section 14 provides:
That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States shall have power to issue writs of
scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which
may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the
principles and usages of law. And that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as
judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose
of an inquiry into the cause of commitment. Provided, that writs of habeas corpus shall in no
case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody under or by colour of the
authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or
are necessary to be brought into court to testify.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82.
51. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82.
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into the cause of commitment." 52
Less than two decades after the 1789 Act, the litigation surrounding the Burr Conspiracy tested the scope of its habeas provisions. Several of Burr's associates were taken into custody based on their
purported involvement in Burr's efforts to assemble an armed force for
his Western expedition. Two of the men, Erick Bollman and Samuel
Swartwout, were taken into custody by federal military officials,
charged with treason, and transported to the District of Columbia.
President Jefferson, fearful that Bollman and Swartwout would be released through the writ, encouraged Congress to suspend habeas. The
Senate passed a three-month suspension bill, but the House overwhelmingly refused to embrace the measure. 53 The circuit court denied Bollman and Swartwout habeas relief, 54 and they subsequently
sought relief in the Supreme Court. When two members of the Court
openly questioned whether the Court could lawfully exercise habeas
jurisdiction,55 Chief Justice Marshall directed that "[t]he whole subject w[ould] be taken up de novo. "56
The Court ultimately issued the writ on the ground that the prosecution failed to allege any treasonous conduct on the part of prisoners
that would render them susceptible to trial in the District of
Columbia. 57 In the course of the opinion, Chief Justice Marshall addressed some of the vexing questions regarding the scope of federal
habeas. Perhaps most importantly, he insisted that the entirety of the
federal courts' habeas jurisdiction was a function of statute - that the
federal courts possessed no common law authority to issue the writ. 58
Accordingly, to the extent that the Suspension Clause affirmatively
guaranteed the federal writ, it did so by commanding Congress to establish such jurisdiction. Following this reasoning, the Chief Justice
intimated that the Judiciary Act was undoubtedly the product of
52. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82.
53. The circumstances surrounding the litigation are set forth in Dallin H. Oaks, The
"Original" Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. Cr. REV. 153, 159-62.
54. United States v. Bollman, 24 F. Cas. 1189 (C.C.D. Col. 1807) (No. 14,622).
55. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 75 n.* (1807) (Justice Chase "doubted the
jurisdiction of this court to issue a habeas corpus in any case," while Justice Johnson questioned
whether Section 14 established independent habeas jurisdiction or simply established "a mere
auxiliary power to enable courts to exercise some other jurisdiction given by law.").
56. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 75 n.*.
57. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 135 ("[T]hat no part of this crime was committed in the district of
Columbia is apparent. It is therefore the unanimous opinion of the court that they cannot be
tried in this district.").
58. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 93 ("Courts which originate in the common law possess a
jurisdiction which must be regulated by their common law, until some statute shall change their
established principles; but courts which are created by written law, and whose jurisdiction is
defined by written law, cannot transcend that jurisdiction.").
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Congress's perceived "obligation of providing efficient means by which
this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity." 59
It should be apparent that this "obligation" theory, in addition to
denying common law habeas powers to the federal courts, implicitly
rejected the view that the Suspension Clause is concerned primarily or
exclusively with the habeas powers of state courts. If the Suspension
Clause were intended to safeguard state judicial power, surely there
would be no "obligation" via the Clause to provide for federal habeas
review. The Chief Justice's opinion thus gives no hint that the Clause
rests on federalism, as opposed to individual liberty and separation-ofpowers, concerns.
The other central aspects of the Court's opinion concerned the
scope of the Judiciary Act. Although the Court had exercised habeas
jurisdiction prior to Bollman, 60 substantial doubts remained concerning both the reach of the Act and its constitutionality. First, the statutory provision authorizing "inquiry into the cause of commitment"
appeared to apply only to judges in their individual capacity and not
to the sitting Court. Justice Marshall dismissed this argument as untenable because he thought Congress surely did not want to give
judges greater power in the privacy of their chambers than in open
court, 61 a conclusion bolstered by another provision in the Judiciary
Act that was apparently premised on the Supreme Court's authority to
grant the writ for this purpose. 6 2
Second, in the wake of Marbury v. Madison, 63 it appeared doubtful
that Congress could enlarge the Court's original jurisdiction to encompass habeas actions. Such actions ordinarily would not fall within the
limited class of "original" cases that, according to Marbury, defined
the constitutional maximum of Article III. 64 The Court avoided this
difficulty by characterizing habeas jurisdiction as "appellate," relying
on the proposition that the writ's purpose is "the revision of a decision
59. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 95.
60. Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 17 (1795).
61. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 96 ("It would be strange if the judge, sitting on the bench, should be
unable to hear a motion for this writ where it might be openly made, and openly discussed, and
might yet retire to his chamber, and in private receive and decide upon the motion.").
62. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 33, 1 Stat. 91-92 (granting the Supreme Court - as well as
the lower federal courts - discretionary power to set bail in capital cases).
63. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
64. The Court made clear in Marbury that the Court's original jurisdiction was limited to
those cases specified in the first sentence of Article Ill, Section 2, Clause 2: "Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party
...." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174. The state is not ordinarily thought to be the real party in
interest in a typical habeas action.
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of an inferior court." 65 By stretching traditional notions of appellate
power even further, the Court ultimately entertained habeas actions
brought to the Court in the first instance66 as well as actions, like Bollman's, that sought review of habeas decisions by lower federal
courts. 67
Finally, the Court dismissed the notion that Section 14 did not
constitute an independent grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts.
On one theory, voiced by Justice Johnson68 and embraced by a recent
academic commentator, 69 Section 14 established habeas jurisdiction
merely to facilitate the courts' exercise of jurisdiction independently
conferred by other provisions. On this view, the qualifying language
of the first part of Section 14 - authorizing courts to issue writs
"which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions"70 - was a global restraint on the courts' power to exercise any
of the writs mentioned in Section 14, including habeas corpus. Had
this reading been accepted, the habeas power of the federal courts in
Bollman could have stemmed only from the Constitution or from the
common law.
Chief Justice Marshall avoided both of these conclusions by limiting the scope of the qualifying language. His central support for this
reading was his position, outlined above,7 1 that the Suspension Clause
obligated Congress to make the writ available. Thus, according to the
Chief Justice, prudence counseled in favor of construing Section 14 as
an independent jurisdictional grant because a more narrow reading of
the Act's jurisdictional scope would raise constitutional difficulties.
This integrated approach to the Suspension Clause and the habeas
statute harmonized two central commitments of the Chief Justice. By
refusing to acknowledge federal common law habeas powers, the Chief
Justice reaffirmed his contention that the "writtenness" of the
Constitution was significant to its interpretation. The existence of a
written Constitution, after all, was crucial to Marbury's defense of
judicial review. 72 At the same time, by holding that the Judiciary Act
conferred broad habeas powers and that such powers were in some
65. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 101.
66. See, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568 (1833).
67. See, e.g., Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868).
68. See supra note 55.
69. See Paschal, supra note 6, at 632.
70. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. 82 (for the full text of section 14, see supra note 50).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
72. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 ("The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and
that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.").
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sense mandated by the Suspension Clause, the Chief Justice augmented federal judicial power.
Thus, by the early nineteenth century, the Court had embraced the
view that the Constitution guaranteed some form of the federal writ.
At the same time, the Judiciary Act's explicit refusal to extend the
writ to prisoners in state custody provided strong evidence that the
first Congress did not understand the Constitution's guarantee of a
federal habeas corpus to extend to such prisoners. Nor had the Court
embraced the view that state (as opposed to federal) habeas enjoyed
constitutional protection. Finally, by casting its own habeas jurisdiction as "appellate" because it involved review of decisions by lower
courts, the Court paved the way for regarding habeas more generally
as a means of addressing ·~udicial" as well as "extrajudicial"
detentions.
2.

Federal Habeas Practice Before the Civil War

Federal habeas review during the period between the Founding of
the Constitution and the Civil War was generally quite limited.
Although commentators agree with this basic proposition, 73 considerable disagreement remains about the reasons for its limited scope.
Professor Paul Bator's influential study of court opinions led him to
conclude that federal habeas "was simply not available at all to one
convicted of crime by a court of competent jurisdiction. " 74 In this
respect, Bator argued, habeas corpus in this country mirrored the
quite circumscribed English writ secured by the Habeas Corpus Act of
1679. 75 Bator uses this descriptive history to support a normative conclusion. In Bator's view, federal habeas review should be confined to
the adequacy of a state's corrective processes and should not extend to
the accuracy of a state court's underlying judgment. Accordingly,
Bator argues that the series of post-Civil War decisions, culminating in
73. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 466 (1963) (arguing that habeas review permitted federal
courts only to inquire into the competence of the tribunal); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next
Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 CoLUM. L. REV.
1997, 2062 (1992) (arguing that the writ acted as a substitute for direct Supreme Court review of
nationally important questions in situations in which such review was not meaningfully
available); Oaks, supra note 9, at 246 (arguing that state habeas litigation was far more significant
than federal habeas litigation in the period before the Civil War).
74. Bator, supra note 73, at 466.
75. Id. at 466 n.51 ("The principle that a person convicted by a court of general criminal
jurisdiction is not entitled to habeas corpus derives from the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Cur.
2, c. 2, which expressly excepted 'persons convict[ed] or in Execution by legal process.' "). For u
contrary reading of the Habeas Corpus Act, see Brieffor Respondent at 31-32, United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) (No. 23) (argument of Professor Freund).
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Brown v. Allen, 16 that expansively construed federal habeas jurisdiction should be rejected as unwarranted departures from the more
traditional scope of the writ.
Bator's description of habeas practice, now thirty years old, was
essentially unchallenged until a similarly ambitious study by Professor
Gary Peller concluded that habeas review was in fact far broader. 77
Peller argues that the limited scope of the Supreme Court's habeas
jurisdiction was exceeded by the habeas powers of the lower federal
courts, 78 and that such courts could (and did) look beyond the mere
general jurisdiction of the convicting court. 79 Bator's central error,
according to Peller, was mistaking the limited scope of pre-Brown federal constitutional protections for actual limitations on the scope of
the writ. so In Peller's account, the scope of federal habeas review of
constitutional issues generally mirrored the Court's approach to such
questions on direct review. The debate between Bator and Peller remains alive and consequential, as various factions of the current Court
continue to debate the proper scope of habeas for state prisoners. 81
Two scholars have recently deepened and illuminated the BatorPeller debate. Professor James Liebman has demonstrated in an elaborate study of nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century habeas
decisions that, contrary to Bator's position, the Court "did not limit
habeas corpus review either to jurisdictional claims or to claims attacking pretrial as opposed to postconviction detention." 82 At the
same time, Liebman argues that Peller sought to prove too much because the Court did in fact refuse to address certain constitutional
76. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
77. Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 579 (1982).
78. Id. at 603.
79. Id. at 662-63.
80. For example, Peller cites the notorious case of Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), in
which Frank alleged that his trial had been dominated by a mob and thus deprived him of his
right to due process. Peller, supra note 77, at 646. The Court rejected the claim on the ground
that Frank had been able to present his allegations to the Georgia Supreme Court. In Peller's
account, Frank illustrates the Court's narrow understanding of the requirements of the Due
Process Clause. Frank lost not because the Court refused to address the merits of his
constitutional claim, but because, as a matter of due process, state court review of a mobdomination claim was constitutionally sufficient. Thus, Peller maintains that resolution of
Frank's claim on federal habeas was no different than it would have been on direct review. Id. at
646.
81. See, e.g., Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992) (arguing, via Bator, that the historically
limited scope of habeas corpus counsels against de novo review of mixed questions of law and
fact); 112 S. Ct. at 2493-98 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing with Peller's view
that the scope of habeas corpus had been much broader than previously acknowledged).
82. Liebman, supra note 73, at 2059.
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claims on habeas. 83 What Bator and Peller both missed, on Liebman's
account, is the intricate connection between the scope of habeas review
and the availability of other forms of federal review of federal claims.
The Court continually adjusted the scope of habeas review in both the
state and federal prisoner cases based on whether some other federal
jurisdictional vehicle was available to address substantial federal
claims. In the federal prisoner context, for example, this thesis explains why the scope offederal habeas for federal prisoners diminished
after Congress established federal appellate review of criminal convictions in 1891. 84 In the state prisoner context, Liebman's account explains why the scope of habeas corpus increased when federal review
as of right through writ of error became largely discretionary. 85 Overall, Liebman's extensive review of the cases persuasively demonstrates
that federal habeas review of federal convictions before the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment extended to virtually all substantial constitutional claims, even in cases challenging criminal convictions. 86
A separate study of nineteenth-century habeas decisions by
Professor Ann Woolhandler attempts to locate such cases in the
broader context of judicial review of official action. 87 Woolhandler,
like Liebman, takes issue with Bator's claim that federal habeas had
traditionally been unavailable to review postconviction constitutional
claims. Bator, in his own account, conceded that, in a "a few classes
of issues (principally the constitutionality of the statute creating the
offense)," the Court addressed constitutional claims brought by convicted persons, even though such claims "did not really bear on the
competence [i.e., jurisdiction] of the committing court." 88 Woolhandler shows that this seemingly minor concession actually is quite
significant.
During most of the nineteenth century, the Court and members of
the broader legal culture did not typically characterize officers engaged in unauthorized illegal acts as acting "unconstitutionally." 89
Such "ad hoc or random official illegality" was more commonly
83. Id. at 2093.
84. Id. at 2092-93.
85. Id. at 2092.
86. See id. at 2059 n.354 (citing cases in which the Court granted relief on, or addressed,
nonjurisdictional claims); id. at 2059-60 & n.355 (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2
(1866), and Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806), as cases in which the Court
"overturned what amounted to criminal convictions").
87. Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993).
88. Bator, supra note 73, at 483-84.
89. Woolhandler, supra note 87, at 605-06.
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thought to give rise to liability under the common law. 90 In both
criminal and civil contexts, parties thus couched virtually all constitutional, as opposed to common law, claims as actions challenging the
constitutionality of statutes. 91 Hence, the Court's willingness throughout the nineteenth century to entertain constitutional challenges to
statutes in federal habeas actions was equivalent, as a practical matter,
to a willingness to entertain the full range of cognizable constitutional
claims. Ultimately, what Bator regards as a radical expansion of federal habeas can be traced, in Woolhandler's terms, to an increased
willingness on the part of the Court to view ad hoc illegality as actionable under the Constitution. 92
As this recent work illustrates, it is simply wrong to assert that the
writ known to the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment was the
same narrowly circumscribed writ known at English law, or perhaps
even known to the Framers of the Suspension Clause. Although it is
true that federal habeas review has more bite today than it did in 1867,
the expansion is more fairly attributable to other factors - the growth
of constitutional claims available to state prisoners via the Due
Process Clause, the increased willingness to view official illegality as
"unconstitutional" conduct, and the diminished opportunities for direct review as of right - than it is to a radical redefinition of "habeas"
itself. Accordingly, if courts should "incorporate" the privilege of
habeas corpus via the Due Process Clause, they need not limit the
newly defined right, as Justice Harlan and Chief Justice Burger suggested, to review of the legality of a detention or of the jurisdiction of
the convicting court.93
3. Statutory Expansions of the Federal Writ
Given that fears of intrusive federal power appear to have contributed significantly to the Framing of the Suspension Clause, 94 one of
the striking features of federal habeas practice in the early and midnineteenth century was the writ's role in assuring the supremacy of
federal law. As mentioned above, 95 the Judiciary Act of 1789 explicitly withheld federal habeas review of detentions by state authorities.
90. Id.
91. This distinction between "unconstitutional" laws and merely tortious conduct by state
officials is reflected in the Fourteenth Amendment itself, which forbids states from "mak[ing] or
enforc[ing] any law which shali abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States ...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
92. Woolhandler, supra note 87, at 621.
93. See supra note 8 (citing cases).
94. See supra text accompanying note 38.
95. See supra note 50.
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Nonetheless, Congress gradually extended federal habeas jurisdiction
to meet specific challenges to federal authority posed by state law
prosecutions.
When South Carolinians declared federal tariffs unconstitutional at
the climax of the nullification controversy, President Jackson feared
that federal officers seeking to enforce the tariffs would be subject to
state interference. 96 Upon Jackson's initiative, Congress authorized
federal judges to exercise habeas jurisdiction in cases involving prisoners, federal or state, confined for acts committed "in pursuance of a
law of the United States." 97 The crisis subsided soon after the statute
became law, but Congress's use of federal habeas as a means of vindicating particular federal interests rather than protecting state sovereignty or individual liberty marked a significant transformation of the
writ.
Faced with another conflict between national and state power less
than a decade later, Congress again expanded federal habeas jurisdiction, this time to permit federal review of cases involving federal or
state prisoners who are "subjects or citizens of a foreign State, and
domiciled therein .... " 98 This expansion was prompted by the diplomatic crisis that ensued when New York tried a British citizen who
had attempted to prevent American assistance to Canadian rebels during the winter revolt of 1837-1838.99 The United States denied a
British request to release the prisoner on the ground that New York
properly ·retained jurisdiction over persons suspected of committing
crimes within its boundaries. The case ended in an acquittal, but
Congress, fearful that national foreign policy might again be subject to
the vagaries of independent state criminal processes, ensured that federal courts would have the final word regarding the validity of detentions of foreign citizens.
The writ's role in enforcing national policy increased as the sectional conflict over slavery intensified. It is somewhat ironic that the
"Great Writ" became an important tool in overcoming Northern
resistance to the Fugitive Slave Act. 100 Thus, despite recent histori96. See DUKER, supra note 16, at 187; WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR:
THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA 1816-1836, at 283 (1966).
97. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634-35.
98. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539.
99. The McLeod affair is discussed in PAUL BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THU
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1466 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER]; DUKER, supra note 16, at 188-89; CHARLES G. HAINES & FOSTER H. SHERWOOD,
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1835-1864, at
206-17 (1957).
100. See, e.g., Ex parte Sifford, 22 F. Cas. 105 (D.C.S.D. Ohio 1857) (No. 12,848); Ex parte
Jenkins, 13 F. Cas. 445 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 7259). At the same time, abolitionists
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ans' insistence that the Framers designed the Suspension Clause to
protect state sovereignty and individual liberty from a potentially unresponsive and vast national government, 101 the early interpretations
of the Clause and subsequent federal practice suggested otherwise. By
the time of the Civil War, the federal writ in its actual implementation
could claim a greater affinity with the Supremacy Clause than with the
various provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Of course, the most significant statutory expansion of the writ occurred in the Judiciary Act of 1867. 102 The Act extends the writ to
"all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in
violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States." 103 More than a century later, the 1867 Act, with some impor.:.
tant modifications, still provides the basic framework for the current
regime of federal habeas review of state convictions. 104 This regime
permits, with some recent exceptions, 105 state prisoners to relitigate
properly preserved federal issues in federal court after such issues are
fully exhausted in the state system.
The plain meaning of the language in the 1867 Act would suggest
that the Reconstruction Congress sought, consistent with the writ's
prior expansions, to increase substantially federal judicial supervision
over the enforcement of federal law. Indeed, Justice Brennan, in justifying a lenient policy toward state prisoners who forfeited their claims
in state court, insisted that the 1867 Act reflected a "clear congressional policy of affording a federal forum for the determination of the
federal claims of state criminal defendants." 106 In Justice Brennan's
view, the Act was part of a more general effort to ensure the vindication of rights that were soon to be secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 107 Justice Brennan's account is buttressed by the famous
attempted to use state habeas to prevent slave owners from returning to the South with fugitive
slaves. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836).
101. See supra note 42.
102. Judiciary Act, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
103. Judiciary Act, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (1867).
104. Federal habeas for federal prisoners has been largely supplanted by a separate
postconviction framework. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988).
105. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (generally precluding federal habeas
review of "new" law claims); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (precluding federal habeas
litigation of Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims when the state courts have provided a
"full and fair" opportunity to present such claims in state court); cf. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113
S. Ct. 1710 (1993) (establishing more deferential "harmless error" standard than is applied to
constitutional claims on direct review).
106. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 418 (1963).
107. In 1867, Congress was anticipating resistance to its Reconstruction measures and
planning the implementation of the post-war constitutional Amendments. . . . [T]he
measure that became the Act of 1867 seems plainly to have been designed to furnish a
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declaration of Representative Lawrence that "[i]t is a bill of the largest
liberty." 108 Lawrence, who introduced the habeas measure in the
House, explained that the Act's purpose was "to make the jurisdiction
of the courts and judges of the United States coextensive with all the
powers that can be conferred upon them." 109 Senator Trumbull,
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, made similar comments in introducing the bill to the Senate. 110
Although both supporters and opponents of broad federal habeas
review have embraced Justice Brennan's understanding of the central
purposes of the 1867 Act, 111 an exhaustive study of the meager legislative history led one scholar to conclude that such claims about the
Act's purported purposes were wildly inflated. 112 Professor Lewis
Mayers maintained that the best evidence available suggests that the
Act was intended to provide a federal judicial remedy against "oppressive apprenticeship and labor contract laws." 113 In Mayers's view, a
careful analysis of the history surrounding its passage reveals that the
framers of the Act did not intend to authorize substantial federal oversight over state criminal processes. 114 Representative Lawrence's
comments, according to Mayers, have been taken out of context, and
Senator Trumbull's words reflected his "apparent ignorance of the
purpose of the House bill."tts
method additional to and independent of direct Supreme Court review of state court
decisions for the vindication of the new constitutional guarantees.
372 U.S. at 415-16.
108. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866).
109. Id.
110. Trumbull stated:
[T]he habeas corpus act of 1789, to which this bill is an amendment, confines the jurisdiction
of the United States courts in issuing writs of habeas corpus to persons who are held under
United States Jaws. Now, a person might be held under a State law in violation of the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and he ought to have in such a case the benefit of
the writ, and we agree that he ought to have recourse to the United States courts to show
that he was illegally imprisoned in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4229 (1866).
111. Bator, supra note 73, at 475 n.80 ("There is no clear indication what moved the
Congress ... (though surely the underlying concern was the enforcement of the reconstruction
legislation)."); Collings, supra note 8, at 351 (maintaining that the Act sought "to facilitate
enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts"); Pollak, supra note 24, at 52 n.9 ("The act was plainly
intended to help safeguard the new ... constitutional rights created after the Civil War."); Note,

Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Convictions: An Interplay of Appellate Ambiguity and
District Court Discretion, 68 YALE L.J. 98, 98 (1958).
112. Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian,
33 U. CHI. L. REV. 31, 55-56 (1965) ("[T]here is no foundation for the Court's assertions that the
1867 act was intended to afford a new remedy for state prisoners, that it was enacted in
contemplation of anticipated southern resistance to Reconstruction, and that it was aimed at
implementing the fourteenth amendment.").
113. Id. at 49.
114. Id. at 58.
115. Id. at 38-39.
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Mayers's position encounters several problems, not the least of
which is explaining why Congress chose to express its purportedly
narrow purpose in such expansive language. In this respect, Mayers's
argument reproduces the same debate about the framers' intentions in
creating the Fourteenth Amendment: if, as some argue, the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment were solely concerned with securing the
rights of the newly freed slaves, why did they not simply say so? 116
Moreover, Mayers's extensive effort to disprove the availability of any
meaningful legislative history 117 undercuts his confident assertion that
the Reconstruction Congress was not concerned with possible state
hostility to newly recognized federal rights of state prisoners. 118 If
anything, Mayers reveals the inadequacy of his strict intentionalist approach in attempting to gauge the "true" meaning of this
Reconstruction statute.119
Finally, given his deep commitment to context as a means of illuminating the intentions of the drafters, it is surprising that Mayers
regards as "totally unrelated" Congress's decision to adjust writ-oferror review of state judgments at the same time that it chose to expand federal habeas. 120 Indeed, the striking feature of the 1867 Act is
that it is fairly regarded as part of a more general effort to expand
federal review of state decisions. 121 In addition to extending habeas
review to "any person" detained in violation of federal law, Congress
had recently provided for wider removal of federal issues from state to
federal court. 122 The removal statute permitted removal both before
116. Mayers responds to this criticism, noting that "[q]uite possibly it was thought that one
seeking relief through habeas corpus from detention under such vagrancy or contract labor
statutes would find the broader phrase, 'restrained of his liberty in violation of the constitution,'
more serviceable than the narrower 'held in slavery or involuntary servitude.' " Id. at 44.
117. According to Mayers:
Such then is the congressional history of the measure-presentation without written report
on the floors of both houses and enactment without discussion of its purposes in either house
other than the explanation offered by the member reporting it, with its proponent in the
Senate ignorant of both its genesis and of the explanation offered by its draftsman on the
floor of the House. Although the Supreme Court has been able to find in this legislative
history a clear congressional intention to create a novel form of federal review of state
convictions, it is impossible to speak confidently of the intent of even the two or three
members of Congress most intimately concerned with enactment of the measure.
Id. at 42 (footnotes omitted).
118. Id. at 54-55. For further criticism of Mayers's article, see Larry W. Yackle, Form and
Function in the Administration of Justice: The Bill of Rights and Habeas Corpus, 23 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 685, 695-702 (1990).
119. Mayers's intentionalism raises particular problems in his focus on the purported
intentions of Representative Lawrence, the presumed drafter of the measure in the House, rather
than on the understanding of the Bill by all of the members of Congress that passed the measure.
See Yackle, supra note 118, at 696.
120. Mayers, supra note 112, at 35.
121. See Liebman, supra note 73, at 2064.
122. Habeas Corpus Act, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 755, 756-57 (1863).
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and after judgment in the state court; 123 moreover, in authorizing removal of certain claims arising under "the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States," the removal provision employed the same
expansive language as the habeas provision. 124 The expansion of writof-error jurisdiction, which Mayers regards as coincidental, eliminated
the then-existing statutory requirement that review of federal questions adjudicated in state court be confined to errors appearing "on the
face of the record." 125 A "contextual" reading of the habeas statute
does not suggest a series of isolated jurisdictional developments.
Rather, these statutes reveal Congress's overall effort - through removal, writ-of-error, and habeas jurisdiction - to enhance opportunities to adjudicate federal questions in the federal courts.
The statutory approach to federal habeas prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment, then, like the federal cases, suggests that the writ had
become an important, although not exclusive, jurisdictional vehicle for
assuring federal enforcement of federal rights. The writ known to the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment was not simply a writ of the
"largest liberty," but also a writ essential to federal supremacy.
4. State Habeas Before the Civil War

After the ratification of the Constitution, many states adopted
their own constitutional guarantees concerning habeas corpus using
the Suspension Clause as a model. 126 For the most part, though, the
scope of state habeas was a function of state statutes and the common
law. State statutory provisions closely tracked the English Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679, 127 which prescribed specific remedies and civil
penalties against legal authorities who did not answer the writ. Like
the English version, the state habeas statutes focused on the rights of
persons detained before trial, especially on defendants' rights against
123. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 99, at 483-84 (discussing removal under the 1863
Act).
124. Liebman, supra note 73, at 2049.
125. See id. at 2063.
126. Four states already had constitutional guarantees by 1789. N.C. CONST. of 1776, dee!.
of rights, § 13; GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LX; MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. 6, art. VII; N.H.
CONST. of 1784, pt.I, art. XV. Several of the 13 original states included habeas provisions soon
after the Constitution was ratified, see, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 14, and all 21 of the
states admitted between 1787 and 1860 likewise included some constitutional provision
concerning the suspension of the writ. See, e.g.• MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 12. Virtually all
of the constitutional provisions adopted after the ratification of the federal Constitution used
language identical to the federal provision. See Oaks, supra note 9, at 247-51 (discussing state
constitutional provisions).
127. 31 Car. 2, c.2 (1679); see Oaks, supra note 9, at 253 (maintaining that states "slavishly"
followed the English Act).
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warrantless detentions and denials of bail. 128 Following the perceived
limited scope of the English Act, 129 many states adhered in form to the
proposition that habeas generally would be unavailable to petitioners
imprisoned pursuant to a conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction.130 Nonetheless, state courts exercising their common law jurisdiction in some cases entertained postconviction challenges to the
constitutionality of the statute creating the offense131 or to the legality
of the sentence. 132 As in the federal context, these "exceptions"
tended in practice to swallow the rule. 133
State courts also exercised habeas jurisdiction to review the legality
of certain federal detentions during a substantial portion of the preCivil War period. Such cases generally involved efforts to release federal soldiers from enlistment contracts. 134 When the Wisconsin
Supreme Court put the writ to a broader purpose - to secure the
release of an abolitionist who had been convicted in a federal proceeding of aiding and abetting a fugitive slave - the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that state courts altogether lacked power to interfere with persons imprisoned under the authority of the federal government. 135
Chief Justice Taney's opinion emphatically rejected the proposition
that states occupy an important role in safeguarding the liberty of federal prisoners. Perhaps overstating the case against concurrent habeas
jurisdiction, the Chief Justice maintained that the Union could not
"have lasted a single year" had states been empowered to review the
federal convictions of persons held within their borders. 136 Thus, as in
Marbury, the Court eschewed any notion that the Suspension Clause
of the Constitution preserves the power of state courts to review federal detentions.
128. Id. at 258.
129. See Brief for Respondent at 31, United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) (No. 23)
(contesting the conventional reading of the English Act).
130. Oaks, supra note 9, at 261-62.
131. The most famous instance occurred in a state court's review of a federal convict's
sentence. In Ex parte Booth, 3 Wis. 157 (1854), the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered the
release of Sherman Booth, who had been convicted of aiding and abetting the escape of a slave in
violation of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
132. ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 164-202, 330-35 (1st ed. 1858).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
134. See, e.g., Sims Case, 61 Mass. 285, 309 (1851); Commonwealth v. Cushing, 11 Mass. 67
(1814); State v. Dimick, 12 N.H. 194 (1841). The military cases are discussed at length in an
1858 treatise on habeas corpus practice. HURD, supra note 132, at 164-202 (citing cases); see also
Oaks, supra note 9, at 274-76 (discussing the use of the writ by minor-enlistees).
135. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
136. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 515.
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C. Summary
By the eve of the Civil War, a distinctive view of the Suspension
Clause and the purposes of the writ had emerged in American politics.
First, following Chief Justice Marshall's exegesis of the Clause in
Bollman, the Court cast habeas as an affirmative individual right of
constitutional dimension. Second, contrary to some current accounts
of the "original" understanding of the Suspension Clause, the writ had
become an important means of securing the states' compliance with
federal law. Each statutory expansion of the writ responded to a specific threat to the supremacy of federal law. At the same time, the
authority of state courts to intervene on behalf of federal prisoners was
rejected as constitutionally impermissible, a far cry from the argument
that such power was constitutionally protected.
This history is important to this article's constitutional argument
in several respects. To a modest extent, the federal judicial and legislative approaches to the writ prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment represent a partial repudiation of two long-standing principles espoused by those who oppose broad federal habeas for state
prisoners. First, they challenge the basic theory of parity - that federal and state courts provide equal and interchangeable vehicles for
enforcing federal rights. Second, they suggest that the Supreme
Court's role in direct review of state judgments may not provide sufficient protection of the federal interest in federal adjudication of federal
rights.
More importantly, though, the history provides a rejoinder to
those who would assert that any constitutional right to habeas must be
severely limited. Diverting one's focus from the Framers of the "original" Constitution to the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment significantly alters the understanding of the writ. If the "right" to habeas
corpus is properly located in the Fourteenth Amendment, the contours of that right must be discussed in light of the writ's transformation between 1789 and 1868. That transformation, in turn, strongly
supports the writ's role in protecting national rights in a national forum. History alone, though, does not absolutely confirm that a federal
right to habeas corpus for state prisoners is fairly found in the
Fourteenth Amendment. That position must draw support from other
forms of constitutional argument.

II.

THE TEXTUAL CASE FOR RECOGNIZING A NATIONAL RIGHT
TO FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS

The second line of the Fourteenth Amendment declares that "[n]o
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State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States." 137 From a textual
standpoint, this declaration should have been, but of course is not, the
most comprehensive constitutional source of individual liberty against
state power. Notwithstanding the Court's decisions construing this
provision - most infamously the Slaughter-House Cases 138 - this
language provides strong support for the conclusion that the
Fourteenth Amendment amplifies the "Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus" protected in Article I.
A. Habeas as a 'Privilege or Immunity" Safeguarded
Against State Abridgment
As I have argued above, 139 by the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment's ratification, the Court had already made clear that the
habeas right secured in Article I did not extend to state prisoners. The
Court likewise made clear in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore 140 that all
of the restraints on power enumerated in Section 9 of Article I, including the Suspension Clause, were not directed at state power. 141 The
Barron Court defended this conclusion by contrasting the introductory language of each restriction in Section 10 ("No state shall ... ")
with the introductory language of Section 9, which makes no reference
to the states. The Court ultimately used this contrast between the language of Section 10 and the other "rights-securing" provisions of the
Constitution to support its more familiar holding in Barron that the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, like the other provisions in
the Bill, did not apply against the states. 142
1.

The Connection Between Article IV and
the Fourteenth Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment thus employs precisely the language
that would avoid Barron's conclusion that the rights or privileges in
the "original" Constitution and Bill of Rights did not run against the
states. 143 The question, then, is whether habeas is properly regarded
as a "privilege or immunity" of national citizenship. Of course, the
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
138. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
139. See supra text accompanying note 72.
140. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
141. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 248. A contrary view is set forth in a constitutional commentary that
predates Barron. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 113 (1825) (arguing that the Suspension Clause applied against states).
142. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 248-49.
143. See Amar, supra note 27, at 1228-29.
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Suspension Clause itself describes the writ of habeas corpus as a "privilege." So, too, had several framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
during debates about Section 1. 144 The references to habeas as a fundamental privilege, both in these debates and in subsequent debates
concerning measures enacted pursuant to Section 5, 145 are ultimately
traceable to Justice Washington's discussion of "privileges or immunities" in Colfield v. Coryefl 146
The suit in Colfield involved an oysterman who was fined under a
New Jersey statute denying nonresidents the right to gather oysters in
New Jersey waters. The plaintiff maintained that the New Jersey law
violated Article !V's guarantee that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States." 147 Justice Washington, writing for the Federal Circuit Court,
rejected the claim on the ground that the oysters in New Jersey waters
belonged to the people of New Jersey as "tenants in common." 148
Nonetheless, Justice Washington offered an expansive description of
the "privileges and immunities" protected by Article IV, including, in
his extensive enumeration, the writ of habeas corpus:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to
those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental;
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments . . . . What
these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than
difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under
the following general heads: ... the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus
149

2.

The Slaughterhouse Reading

Should Justice Washington's language control the interpretation of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
As a textual matter, the only plausible justification for construing the
"privileges and immunities" language of Article IV differently from
the "privileges or immunities" language of the Fourteenth
Amendment rests on the modifying language of the two provisions.
Article IV concerns the "privileges and immunities" of state citizenship ("of Citizens in the several States") whereas the Fourteenth
144. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475, 499, 1117, 1263, 2765 (1866) (statements of
Sens. Trumbull, Cowan, and Howard, and Reps. Wilson and Broomall).
145. See, e.g., 2 CONG. REC. H420 (1874) (statement of Rep. Herndon during debates over
Civil Rights Bill of 1874).
146. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
147. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
148. 6 F. Cas. at 552.
149. 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
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Amendment concerns the "privileges or immunities" of national citizenship ("of citizens of the United States"). Or, put another way, the
drafters' use of the same "privileges and immunities" language is not
dispositive if the framers understood state and national citizenship to
confer differing sets of rights.
This argument, of course, is not merely hypothetical. It is precisely the one offered by Justice Miller in defense of his holding in
Slaughterhouse that the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect the
same rights against absolute state deprivation that Article IV protects
against state discrimination. 150 The argument, though, remains
unpersuasive.
To begin, it seems unlikely that the Reconstruction Congress
would place a term of art in the Fourteenth Amendment, carrying the
baggage of prior interpretation, and expect that the phrase would take
on an entirely different meaning. Moreover, such an expectation is
belied by the repeated invocation of Corjield in the debates; 151 at least
some of the framers understood "privileges or immunities" to be defined aptly by Justice Washington. Justice Miller's quite limited list of
the rights of "national citizenship," on the other hand, has no strong
support other than Justice Miller's own conception of the proper allocation of state and federal power.
Perhaps more importantly, there is little doubt that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended, at a minimum, to ratify Congress's ability
to protect the economic rights of the newly freed slaves. The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 granted freed slaves the right, among others, to
enter into contracts, to purchase and convey property, and to sue. 152
The frequent appearance of Justice Washington's list in the debates is
attributable in part to his explicit enumeration of exactly these rights
in Corjield. 153 Yet, in Slaughterhouse, the Court denies that the
Reconstruction Congress intended to transfer the enforcement of even
150. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873). Justice Miller argued as follows: "It is quite clear,
then, that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State, which are
distinct from each other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the
individual." 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 74. Justice Miller buttressed this argument with the
observation that the first line of Section 1 confers both national and state citizenship on persons
born in the United States whereas the second line protects only the privileges and immunities of
national citizenship:
It is a little remarkable, if this clause was intended as a protection to the citizen of a State
against the legislative power of his own State, that the word citizen of the State should be
left out when it is so carefully used, and used in contradistinction to citizens of the United
States, in the very sentence which precedes it.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 74.
151. See supra note 144.
152. See Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988));
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)).
153. 6 F. Cas. at 551-52 (listing, as fundamental privileges and immunities, "the right to
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these civil rights - "the rights of person and of property" - to the
federal govemment. 154 Hence, the textual argument proves far too
much. It suggests that the Reconstruction Congress, in deciding
whether to adopt the Fourteenth Amendment just weeks after the passage of the Civil Rights of 1866, was content to leave constitutional
doubts surrounding its centerpiece legislation.
Finally, the notion that "privileges or immunities" carries different
meanings, which depend on the sovereign against whom the rights are
asserted, fails to account for the perceived natural law foundation of
such rights. Many of the drafters of the "original" Constitution and
the Fourteenth Amendment believed that "privileges or immunities"
of citizenship were not simply a function of positive law, but the rights
belonging to all free persons. 155 Precisely for this reason, many of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment apparently were surprised to
learn, as they did during the debates, that states were not already constitutionally obligated to afford the various "privileges or immunities"
contained in the Bill of Rights. 156 This natural law foundation is also
evident in Justice Washington's own description of the "privileges and
immunities" of state citizenship as rights "which belong . . . to the
citizens of all free govemments." 157 Hence, Slaughterhouse's textual
argument rejecting a parallel reading of Article IV and the Fourteenth
Amendment reflects neither a good reading of the text nor an adequate
understanding of the context from which the Fourteenth Amendment
emerged.
Even as it rejected the Article IV parallel, though, the Court in
Slaughterhouse nonetheless included the writ of habeas corpus in its
short list of "national" rights. 158 In what manner, on the Court's
view, did the Fourteenth Amendment thereby protect the writ? Looking at the other national rights with which habeas is grouped, the
Fourteenth Amendment does little. In addition to the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the other "privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States" include federal protection on the high seas, the
acquire and possess property of every kind, ... [and] to institute and maintain actions of any
kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal").
154. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 82.
155. See Amar, supra note 27, at 1205-12 {discussing "declaratory theory" of the Bill of
Rights).
156. Id. at 1208-10 {discussing Barron "contrnrians" who did not believe that states could
infringe on the rights contained in the Bill); id. at 1235-36 (arguing that many of the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment initially believed that the Bill of Rights applied to the states, though
they later were informed of Barron's holding by Representative Bingham).
157. 6 F. Cas. at 551.
158. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79 (stating that "the writ of habeas corpus" is a "right[] of the
citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution").
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right to petition the federal government, and the right to use navigable
waters of the United States. 159 Given that this grouping focuses on
preexisting obligations of the federal government, the privilege of the
writ to which Slaughterhouse seemingly refers is the writ that Chief
Justice Marshall found that the Suspension Clause guarantees. 160
That writ, as we have seen, is a federal writ for federal prisoners. 161
If the federal writ for federal prisoners is a "privilege or immunity"
now protected against state abridgment, then presumably states may
not "make or enforce" any laws that interfere with this federal right.
But, as Justice Field observed in dissent, the Constitution, and more
particularly the Supremacy Clause, already forbade states from interfering with the exercise of federal rights: "The supremacy of the
Constitution and the laws of the United States always controlled any
State legislation of that character. But if the amendment refers to the
natural and inalienable rights which belong to all citizens, the inhibition has a profound significance and consequence." 162 Hence, by
Slaughterhouse's reading, the Fourteenth Amendment did not "expand" the constitutional right to habeas corpus located in the
Supremacy Clause. Instead, the Court had rendered the Amendment,
in Justice Field's words, "a vain and idle enactment." 163
B. A Right to Federal Habeas for State Prisoners?
If Slaughterhouse had been decided differently, and the Court had
imported Justice Washington's gloss on Article IV "privileges and immunities" into the Fourteenth Amendment, what would the "new"
habeas right encompass? The most obvious possibility suggested by
the text would be that it would obligate the states, like the federal
government, to make the writ available. 164 Just as the Fourteenth
Amendment would eventually require states to safeguard many of the
"privileges" contained in the Bill of Rights - such as the right to a
jury trial in criminal cases and the right to free speech - so, on this
reading, would the Fourteenth Amendment require states to provide
159. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36. Slaughterhouse's reference to habeas is most
commonly read in just this fashion. Amar, supra note 27, at 1258 (citing 2 WILLIAM W.
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 112830 (1953)).
162. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
163. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
164. If the privilege applied against the states were to mirror the federal protection, perhaps
a narrow range of extraordinary circumstances comparable to "[r)ebellion or [i]nvasion," U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, might justify suspension.
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some form of the writ in appropriate circumstances. Forbidding states
from "mak[ing] or enforc[ing] any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" 165 would become
a requirement to make habeas routinely available.
The difficulty in reconstructing the privilege of habeas corpus in
this way is that it runs contrary to the Reconstruction Congress's apparent belief that recourse to the state courts would not adequately
ensure enforcement of the newly established rights. 166 It is true that
one concrete problem before the Civil War was the failure of judges in
slaveholding states to make the writ available in cases of unauthorized
detentions involving persons of color alleged to be fugitive slaves. 167
But the Reconstruction Congress was acutely aware that the solution
to this problem was not simply to require state courts to exercise their
traditional habeas powers. As noted above, 168 the various expansions
of federal jurisdiction over federal issues in the years immediately preceding the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment reflected an
emerging sense that federal review was essential to federal supremacy.
Hence, the Reconstruction Congress was committed to making federal
review of substantial federal issues practically available in the lower
federal courts. 169 To construe the Fourteenth Amendment as making
certain forms of state court jurisdiction, such as habeas review,
mandatory thus seems somewhat anomalous given the Reconstruction
Congress's willingness, just a year before, to give federal courts full
authority to review unlawful detentions regardless of the availability of
state processes.
1.

The Relationship Between Structure and Rights
in the Original Constitution

The anomaly arises in part because of the important difference between the "privilege" of habeas corpus and the various "privileges"
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. As Professor Akhil Amar's important work illustrates, the "original" Bill, like the unamended
Constitution, rests on a mixture of structural and individual liberty
concerns.17° The Bill of Rights was not at its inception entirely or
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 103-11.
167. See, e.g., HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1982); cf. Mayers, supra note 112, at 43 (arguing that
unlawful detentions of laborers continued to be a concern after the Civil War).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86.
169. See Liebman, supra note 73, at 2055-57; see also supra text accompanying notes 82-86
(discussing Liebman's argument).
170. Amar, supra note 25, at 1132-33, 1205.
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even predominantly focused on safeguarding individuals from
majoritarian constraint. 171 Rather, several provisions of the Bill
address the possibility that representatives of the majority might act
contrary to the majority's will and thus frustrate the goal of popular
self-govemment. 172 Moreover, several provisions of the Bill sought to
promote the values of federalism 173 that are also traditionally associated with the unamended Constitution alone, or with the Tenth
Amendment. Of course, the distinction between "structure" and
"rights" is a difficult one to maintain. Certainly the Framers believed
that the protection of individual rights was inextricably tied to questions of structure; in virtually all of the Federalist Papers, the authors
took care to link structural innovations to the cause of individual liberty .174 Nonetheless, as Amar argues, there is often an unreflective
instinct to regard the Bill as entirely about "individual liberty," an
instinct that has had important adverse consequences for Fourteenth
Amendment interpretation.
More particularly, viewing the Bill of Rights as the sole locus of
"liberty" in the Constitution leads to the "total incorporation" approach of Justice Black. 175 On this view, since the Bill provides the
best textual basis for uncovering the fundamental rights in our traditions, the Fourteenth Amendment should be read to "incorporate,"
and to incorporate only, the liberty-protection provisions of the Bill. 176
This approach does have the virtue of recognizing, as Slaughterhouse
did not, 177 that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to
expand dramatically the constitutional protection of individual liberty.
But, as Amar argues, this "mechanical" approach, by failing to recognize the mix of structure and liberty in both the unamended
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, "incorporates" too much and too
little. 178 Some provisions concerned with individual liberty, such as
the Suspension Clause, are inappropriately excluded from Fourteenth
Amendment consideration. At the same time, contrary to Justice
171. Id. at 1205-06.
172. See id. at 1146-62 (discussing majoritarian aspects of First Amendment); id. at 1175-81
(discussing majoritarian aspects of Fourth Amendment); id. at 1182-99 (discussing majoritarian
aspects of various jury-protecting clauses in the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments).
173. Id. at 1165-73 (uncovering the federalism concerns animating the Second Amendment);
id. at 1157-60 (discussing federalism and the religion clauses).
174. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 23, 28 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 10, 51, 58, 63
(James Madison).
175. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting);
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474-75 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting).
176. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 74-75 (Black, J., dissenting).
177. See supra section II.A.2.
178. Amar, supra note 27, at 1227.
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Black's approach, some rights contained in the Bill, such as the
Establishment Clause, must be "incorporated," if at all, with special
attention to their role in protecting states' rights or the rights of the
public at large. 179
Amar's solution of "refined incorporation" would bring within the
Fourteenth Amendment those provisions in either the unamended
Constitution or the Bill of Rights that can be regarded fairly as "personal privileges." 18° For those provisions that combine personal privilege and the interests of states or the public at large, Amar would
"reconstruct" the provision to preserve the individual liberty aspect
while discarding the "structural" aspect. 181
Amar's nuanced approach to discerning the appropriate relation
between the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights, on the one
hand, and the Fourteenth Amendment, on the other, has enormous
appeal because the Civil War fundamentally altered our understanding
of what types of constitutional structures are most conducive to individual liberty. In the original Constitution and Bill of Rights, the
Framers' ideas of structure and liberty could peacefully coexist: limited national government and the preservation of state autonomy were
likely to diminish the threat to individual liberty. Since the
Fourteenth Amendment identifies states as the central threat to individual liberty, however, it makes little sense to import structural principles premised on state autonomy into the Fourteenth Amendment.
The privilege of habeas corpus presents some difficulties for this
approach. Like some of the provisions in the Bill, the Suspension
Clause seems, as an original matter, to combine structural and individual liberty concerns. The liberty dimension of habeas corpus is apparent: the writ provides a remedy for unlawful and otherwise
unaccountable restraints on personal freedom. As for the structural
dimension, in light of the work of some recent scholars, 182 including
Amar, 183 it is likely that the Clause was intended to protect the ability
of state courts to inquire into the legality of federal detentions. Hence,
following Amar's approach, courts would incorporate the "personal
privilege" aspect of habeas corpus while setting aside the federalism
aspect. Accordingly, courts would read the Fourteenth Amendment,
179. Id. at 1271-72.
180. Id. at 1262, 1264.
181. Id. at 1264-66.
182. See DUKER, supra note 16, at 126 (arguing that "the framers intended the clause only to
restrict Congressional power to suspend state habeas for federal prisoners").
183. Amar, supra note 42, at 1509.
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as the text suggests, to require states to make habeas corpus available
to persons within their own jurisdiction.
This approach, however, ignores the new structural dimensions
that habeas assumed between 1789 and 1868. Whatever its "original"
structural purpose,1 84 the writ of 1868 had become chiefly significant
for its role in assuring the enforcement and supremacy of federal
law. 185 Through Bollman 186 and Ableman, 187 the Court had already
stripped the Suspension Clause of all of its states' rights wrapping.
Both court decisions and congressional legislation established a role
for the writ much more suited to the federalist vision of Hamilton than
to views of Framers such as Luther Martin 188 and John Rutledge, 189
who had envisioned the writ as a check against abusive federal power.
Indeed, the individual liberty aspect of the writ had to some extent
become less significant than its nationalist and unifying function; the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a "speedy and public trial" 190 and
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "[e]xcessive bail" 19 1 covered much of the ground of the English common law writ.
Thus, the "privilege" of habeas corpus was as much structural as it
was personal by 1868. More importantly, the structural component
was fully consistent with the understanding of federal and state power
embraced by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Unlike the
privileges contained in the original Bill, then, the privilege of habeas
corpus need not and should not shed its gradually developed nationalist core as it is absorbed into the Fourteenth Amendment. A truly
"refined" theory of incorporation would instead reconstruct the "original" writ for federal prisoners as a federal writ for all prisoners,
whether detained by federal or state authorities. Such an approach
has the virtue of carrying forward in constitutional terms what the
Reconstruction Congress plainly sought to accomplish through
legislation.
184. See supra section I.A.
185. See supra section l.B.3.
186. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); see supra section I.B.1 (discussing
Bollman).
187. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858); see supra section I.B.4 (discussing
Ableman).
188. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 12, at 213
(arguing to the Maryland convention that the Suspension Clause afforded too much power to the
federal government in overriding state habeas powers).
189. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 12, at 438
(reporting that Rutledge "was for declaring the Habeas Corpus inviolable - He did [not]
conceive that a suspension could ever be necessary at the same time through all the States").
190. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 1.
191. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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The Text Revisited

This approach creates textual difficulties of its own. The language
of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes obligations on states, not on
the federal government. How, then, could the Fourteenth
Amendment be read to require Congress to vest expansive habeas
powers in the lower federal courts to facilitate review of state detentions? One possibility would be to construe Section 5, which states
that "Congress shall have power to enforce" 192 the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as imposing remedial obligations on the federal government. The language of Section 5, though, seems to weaken
rather than to strengthen this argument. Section 5 tracks the language
of Article I, Section 8 ("Congress shall have Power ... "), and it would
be difficult to assert that Congress must exercise each of those enumerated grants of power. 193 Hence, from a purely textual standpoint, it is
better to read Section 5 to permit - not to require - congressional
enforcement of the Amendment. Nonetheless, the case for reading
Section 5 as creating an individual right in federal habeas corpus is
modestly supported by one Framer's suggestion that Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment should be so construed.19 4
Section 5 also has little bearing on Congress's power, as opposed to
obligation, to extend habeas corpus to state prisoners. Even before the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress clearly had the power, via Article
III, to extend habeas jurisdiction over persons detained by state authority .195 Indeed, prior to 1868, no serious constitutional argument
was ever raised challenging the statutory expansions of the writ that
brought particular state detentions - and, in 1867, all state detentions
- within the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts. Nonetheless,
courts have perceived a strong connection between federal habeas review of state convictions and the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, when Pennsylvania, joined by forty other states, challenged the
192. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5.
193. For example, one of the enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8, is the power to
"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, a power
which is widely regarded as discretionary. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22; i11fra
section Ill.C.
194. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1866) (statement of Sen. Cowan) (arguing
that the purpose of Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment was "to give to the negro the
privilege of the habeas corpus; that is, if anybody persisted in the face of the constitutional
amendment in holding him as a slave, that he should have an appropriate remedy to be
delivered").
195. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2 ("[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both
as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress may by
Law have directed.").
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constitutionality of section 2254, 196 which is the current embodiment
of the Habeas Act of 1867, the Third Circuit relied on the Fourteenth
Amendment, not Article III, as the source of Congress's authority to
establish such review.191
Ultimately, then, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment offers
only limited support for a constitutional right to habeas corpus for
state prisoners. On the one hand, the text provides a strong basis for
protecting the "privilege" of the writ from state abridgment. Indeed,
given the correspondence in language between the Suspension Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment, it is surprising that parties have not
urged constitutional claims to the writ more frequently. On the other
hand, though, the text does not support, and in fact undermines, the
claim that the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a right to federal
habeas corpus. Accordingly, the case for constitutionalizing such federal review must be based on other considerations.
III.

RECONSTRUCTING HABEAS IN LIGHT OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: INCORPORATION VIA THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE

This Part examines prevailing constitutional doctrine concerning
Fourteenth Amendment interpretation. In light of the Court's "incorporation" decisions, the courts should recognize the privilege of
habeas corpus protected by the Suspension Clause as a Fourteenth
Amendment due process right. Given the Court's focus on AngloAmerican tradition and specific textual commitments in the
Constitution, the location of the privilege in Article I rather than the
Bill of Rights should not affect this determination.
Once the privilege is brought within the Fourteenth Amendment,
historical, structural, doctrinal, and prudential considerations should
dictate the manner in which courts apply the privilege against the
states. These considerations suggest that the reconstructed habeas
right should assure a meaningful, nondiscretionary opportunity for
federal review of federal claims. Such an interpretation accords with
the role that habeas occupied before 1868, the framers' understanding
of the importance of federal review to the enforcement of federal law,
196. 28 u.s.c. § 2254 (1988).
197. The battle against federal interference with some of these state processes was lost
when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. The Amendment, as every high school boy
knows, forbids states to deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. That necessarily confers federal power to prevent states from doing the forbidden
thing.
United States ex rel. Elliot v. Hendricks, 213 F.2d 922, 928 (3rd Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
851 (1954).
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prevailing constitutional doctrine, and entrenched expectations about
the function of habeas in our current constitutional scheme.
Cast in this way, a constitutional right to federal habeas review for
state prisoners assumes the existence of the lower federal courts. This
assumption, though it appears to be in some tension with Congress's
discretion to establish lower federal courts conferred by Article III, is
a defensible one given the context in which the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted. Accordingly, the Suspension Clause and
the Fourteenth Amendment are rightly read to constitutionalize federal habeas for state prisoners.
A.

The Court's Incorporation Methodology

The quite narrow reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in
Slaughterhouse was of course not the final word regarding the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court gradually shifted its focus to
the adjacent Due Process Clause. After initially recognizing economic
rights in the "property" guarantee of the Due Process Clause, 198 the
Court looked to the Clause as the source of individual liberty more
generally. Indeed, just as the Court dealt its death blow to the "economic due process" doctrine in the wake of the New Deal, the Court
hinted that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause might
protect individuals against state laws that abridge any of the rightsprotecting provisions of the original Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. 199
1.

Text and Tradition

Nonetheless, the process of "incorporating" particular provisions
was a slow and haphazard one. By 1937, the Court had already held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited
states from abridging the First Amendment's protection for speech, 200
198. See, e.g.. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state statute restricting
hours of bakers); Allegeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (invalidating state insurance
regulation via Due Process Clause); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S.
418 (1890) (invalidating state rate·setting procedure via Due Process Clause); Railroad Commn.
Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886) (sustaining regulation of railroad rates but suggesting that Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause might apply to states); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) {finding
no due process violation but noting that some state regulation might deprive private property
owners of constitutionally protected economic rights).
199. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that
"[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those
of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within
the Fourteenth").
200. See, e.g.. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
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press, 201 and assembly, 202 as well as the Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel in capital cases. 203 The Court, though, refused to hold that
the Fourteenth Amendment is appropriately read to protect every
"right" in the Bill from state interference. Instead, the Court suggested that the test for recognizing a particular right in the Due
Process Clause is, in Justice Cardozo's famous phrase, whether the
right is essential to "ordered liberty" and connected to a " 'principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.' " 204 Vying against this open-ended approach,
at the other extreme, was Justice Black's insistence that "total incorporation" of the Bill of Rights held the only hope for a principled,
nondiscretionary interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 205
In the Court's subsequent decisions, neither Justice Black's total
incorporation approach nor Justice Cardozo's natural law formulation
emerged as the sole guiding principle. Instead, the Court has adopted
an amalgam of their approaches, selectively incorporating several provisions of the Bill of Rights and refusing to import many "extratextual" rights through the Due Process Clause. 206 In choosing which
of the provisions to incorporate, the Court, following Justice Cardozo,
has placed great emphasis on "tradition" with special attention to
whether a claimed right "is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of
201. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
202. See, e.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
203. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
204. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S.
312, 316 (1926)).
205. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) ("To hold
that this Court can determine what, if any, provisions of the Bill of Rights will be enforced, and if
so to what degree, is to frustrate the great design of a written Constitution."); see also supra text
accompanying notes 164-68.
206. For example, although the Court has recognized some due process rights in the area of
criminal procedure that are not tied to textual guarantees in the Bill of Rights, see, e.g., In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (recognizing the requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
(protecting defendant's right to discovery of exculpatory evidence), the Court has also recently
made clear that it will no longer engage in general balancing to determine whether a challenged
state criminal procedure satisfies the Due Process Clause. See Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct.
2572 (1992) (refusing to apply three-part test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), in
determining whether states may allocate the burden of proof in competency proceedings to the
defendant). The Court's use of both the positions of Justice Cardozo and Justice Black is
evident. On the one hand, the new standard for evaluating challenged state criminal procedures
is Justice Cardozo's "fundamental traditions" test. See 112 S. Ct. at 2577. On the other hand,
the Court justified its adoption of this test on the ground that:
The Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms to many aspects of criminal procedure, and the
expansion of those constitutional guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the Due
Process Clause invites undue interference with both considered legislative judgments and
the careful balance that the Constitution strikes between liberty and order.
112 S.Ct. at 2576.
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ordered liberty."207 At the same time, Justice Black's position has undoubtedly been influential in ensuring that the Court has found virtually all of the provisions in the Bill of Rights to be sufficiently rooted
in our traditions to command application against the states. 208
2. Looking Beyond the Bill of Rights

From a purely doctrinal standpoint, the right to habeas falls
squarely within the Court's dual approach. The Suspension Clause
expresses a textual commitment to the writ, a conclusion buttressed by
Chief Justice Marshall's suggestion in Bollman that the Clause obligates Congress to make the writ generally available to federal prisoners. 209 As for our Nation's traditions and conscience, judicial
exaltation of the writ by both supporters210 and opponents211 of broad
habeas review confirms the writ's status as a bedrock element of "ordered liberty."212 Of course, judges have disagreed as to the scope of
habeas review essential to preserve such liberty. But the Court's due
process decisions applying the fundamental liberty test reveal a distinction between the question whether to incorporate a particular right
and questions about the manner in which a particular right should be
incorporated. 213 Following this approach, nine members of the Court
need not agree as to the precise formulation of a Fourteenth
207. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).
208. The incorporated provisions include the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and its accompanying judicially
crafted exclusionary rule, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); the Fifth Amendment's
protections against self-incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and double jeopardy,
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a public and
speedy jury trial, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial); Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy trial); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)
(right to public trial), with the benefit of counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
and the opportunity to confront witnesses, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); and the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments. Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
209. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
210. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963) (Brennan, J.) ("Although in form the
Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with the growth
of fundamental rights of personal liberty.").
211. See, e.g.. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 714 (1961) (Clark, J.) ("Throughout the
centuries the Great Writ has been the shield of personal freedom insuring liberty to persons
illegally detained."). Justice Clark dissented in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 445 (1963), as well as
in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 23 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Clark, J.), and
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 325 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Clark, J.).
212. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.).
213. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), for example, the Court unanimously embraced
its prior holding in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), that the Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies against the states, but it disagreed
sharply over whether the "incorporated" right encompasses the exclusionary rule applicable in
federal proceedings. Compare 367 U.S. at 643 (majority opinion) with 367 U.S. at 672 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).

February 1994]

Incorporating the Suspension Clause

903

Amendment habeas right in order for them to all agree that the writ,
by virtue of its special status in our history, should receive some protection via the Due Process Clause.
It might be argued, though, that Justice Black's textual approach
was properly limited to provisions in the Bill of Rights and should not
extend to provisions of the unamended Constitution. This objection
carries little weight. The Framers of the Constitution did not embrace
a rigid dichotomy between structure and rights that such an objection
presupposes. 214 Indeed, the protection of the writ in Article I, Section
9 may actually reflect the Framers' belief that such protection was
more fundamental than the protections embodied in the Bill because it
was included in the Constitution even before those fearful of federal
governmental tyranny insisted on additional safeguards.
Perhaps more importantly, Justice Black's underlying justification
for locating Fourteenth Amendment rights in the Bill of Rights applies with equal force to Article I, Section 9. In Justice Black's view,
courts should embrace "total incorporation" primarily because it
grounds judicial interpretation in authority and thereby preserves the
rule oflaw. 215 The existence of a text prevents judges from "roam[ing]
at large in the broad expanses of policy and morals and . . . trespass[ing], all too freely, on the legislative domain of the States as well
as the Federal Government." 216 Justice Black recognized that interpretive disagreement, and therefore judicial discretion, is an inevitable
aspect of constitutional interpretation. Nonetheless, he regarded interpretation that begins with textual authority as different in kind from
interpretation grounded in abstract philosophical commitments. In
Justice Black's words, "to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes
by looking to the particular standards enumerated in the Bill of Rights
and other parts of the Constitution is one thing; to invalidate statutes
because of application of 'natural law' deemed to be above and undefined by the Constitution is another." 217 Accordingly, if the
Fourteenth Amendment embraces and extends the Bill of Rights because text is important, so too should the Fourteenth Amendment embrace the "right" to habeas corpus enumerated in Article I, Section 9.
214. See Amar, supra note 27, at 1200 (arguing that the placement of rights-protecting
provisions in a "Bill of Rights" rather than Article I, Section 9, was nothing more than
"aesthetic"); supra section II.B.2 {discussing Amar's "refined" incorporation approach).
215. Justice Black also maintained that the "total incorporation" approach found support in
the historical record. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74-75 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
216. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 90 (Black, J., dissenting).
217. 332 U.S. at 91 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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Reconstructing the Writ

So far, I have argued that several familiar forms of constitutional
argument support recognition of a habeas right in the Fourteenth
Amendment. From an intentionalist perspective, the framers of the
Amendment frequently cited the writ as illustrative of the fundamental privileges worthy of national protection. 218 As a matter of history
and structure, the role of habeas corpus in the nation's early development generally, and in the Reconstruction effort more particularly,
highlighted the writ's importance to the enforcement of federal law, a
central concern of the Fourteenth Amendment. 219 From a textual
standpoint, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is appropriately read to safeguard the "privilege" of the
writ from state interference. 220 Finally, as a doctrinal matter, the
Court's Fourteenth Amendment methodology makes the writ a strong
candidate for "incorporation" through the Due Process Clause. 221
At the same time, I have alluded to, though not yet fully defended,
the proposition that the writ protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
is best understood to be the federal writ for state prisoners. This argument draws from the same considerations that justify the recognition
of a Fourteenth Amendment habeas right in the first place: history,
structure, intent, text, and doctrine. But the case for construing the
habeas right in this particular manner requires more interpretive
work. The forms of argument do not converge as neatly and unambiguously as they do in supporting a more general Fourteenth
Amendment habeas right. Historical, structural, and prudential considerations, for example, provide a more persuasive basis than the text
for reading the Fourteenth Amendment to require congressional action. Accordingly, some balancing or prioritizing of these various
considerations is necessary in light of the "commensurability problem"222 that often accompanies recourse to more than one interpretive
mode in constitutional interpretation.
1. Federal or State Writ?

All of the incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights, when applied through the Fourteenth Amendment, directly constrain state
lawmakers and officials. By virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment,
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See supra text accompanying notes 144-49.
See supra sections l.B.2 & I.B.3.
See supra section II.A.
See supra section III.A.
See Fallon, supra note 7, at 1189.
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states must afford criminal defendants a speedy and public jury trial,

issue warrants only on a showing of probable cause, and refrain from
imposing cruel and unusual punishments. If the Suspension Clause is
incorporated in a like manner, is it not also properly understood to
prevent states from suspending or withholding the writ from their own
prisoners?
As I have argued above, 223 reconstructing the writ in this fashion
makes little sense given the circumstances surrounding the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment. By 1868, virtually every state had
adopted some state constitutional provision concerning habeas
corpus. 224 Notwithstanding these state guarantees, the
Reconstruction Congress extended federal jurisdiction over all state
detentions. 225 It is highly unlikely that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment were concerned with constitutionalizing state habeas review just after they had empowered the federal courts to assess independently whether state detentions violate federal law. Given the
framers' manifest distrust of state court adjudication of federal claims,
the national interest would have been little served by mandating the
availability of state court review.
Along these same lines, by the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the writ had already become primarily a means of challenging judicial detentions rather than unauthorized detentions by
public officials or private parties. Thus, the writ's central function was
to permit one court to review the actions of another. Once the writ is
cast as a judicial check against improper judicial action, the writ is
most sensibly vested in a reviewing court that is independent of the
detaining court. Wholly apart from assertions about the purported
superiority offederal judges, 226 common sense suggests that the meaningfulness of judicial review is greatly enhanced if the reviewing court
owes no special allegiance to the court whose judgment is subject to
review. 227 For precisely this reason, the best account of the intent un223. See supra section H.B. I.
224. See Oaks, supra note 9, at 249.
225. Judiciary Act, ch. 28, § I, 14 Stat. 385'(1867).
226. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 333.34 (1988)
(suggesting that federal courts are more focused on, and therefore better equipped to resolve,
federal constitutional questions); Michael Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?, 22 GA. L. REV. 282,
300-01 & n.84 (1988) (arguing that "federal judges may be more sympathetic to the countermajoritarian claims asserted in ... constitutional litigation"); Woolhandler, supra note 87, at 634
(suggesting that the centralization of the federal system, the selection and retention processes for
federal judges, and the institutional settings of state and federal courts support the proposition
that federal courts are more effective in enforcing federal rights).
227. Indeed, some states vest postconviction review in the court of conviction, effectively
asking the trial judge to determine whether his own initial legal rulings were justified. See, e.g.•
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derlying the "original" Suspension Clause is that the Clause was
designed to preserve state power to review federal detentions. 228 Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall's alternative reading - protecting a federal writ for federal prisoners - was plausible only because the
separation-of-powers rationale carried somewhat more weight at a
time when habeas corpus was still frequently invoked to challenge extrajudicial detentions. Hence, changes in the nature of the writ prior
to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment strengthen the case for
incorporating a right to federal habeas review.
Of course, to argue that the framers were more interested in protecting federal, rather than state, habeas review of state detentions in
the aftermath of the Civil War is not to assert that they specifically
intended to constitutionalize federal habeas for state prisoners in the
Fourteenth Amendment. This assertion not only would be difficult to
prove, it would probably also be wrong. "Habeas corpus" is not now,
nor has it ever been, a fully fixed and determinate concept. Many of
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly those who invoked Colfield, 229 likely believed that the historic writ should gain additional protection via the Privileges or Immunities Clause. But they
also probably entertained varying ideas about the nature of the writ,
both in terms of who should issue it (federal or state courts) and under
what circumstances (pretrial review only or full collateral review).
The most we can do from an intentionalist and historical perspective is
to weave congressional legislation, habeas practice, and the basic goals
of the Fourteenth Amendment into a coherent whole. We cannot,
and, indeed, the framers most likely could not, provide an authoritative answer about their specific intentions concerning the constitutional status of habeas corpus in light of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 230
Our inability to find determinate "intent" regarding the framers'
understanding of habeas corpus should not lead us to dismiss incorporation of the Suspension Clause altogether. Text and doctrine, as a
threshold matter, bring habeas within the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment. They provide strong grounds for undertaking the effort
of reconstructing the writ and applying it in some way against the
states. In this respect, the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of the
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07, § 2(b) (West Supp. 1993) (directing state habeas
petitions to be filed in the court of conviction).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 144-46.
230. Cf RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-37 (1978) (contrasting
Framers' "concepts" that they embedded in the Constitution at a general level and the particular
"conceptions" or instantiations of those concepts in their practice).
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writ of habeas corpus is much like its guarantee of "due process of
law." Both concepts are "essentially contestable" 231 and must be
given meaning by looking to political and moral practices outside of
the text; yet the text itself commands that governmental actors obey,
and judicial systems enforce, these lofty concepts in concrete cases.
Apart from historical, structural, and intentionalist arguments,
prudential considerations should also play a role in defining the
Fourteenth Amendment habeas right. A persuasive interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment must accommodate, or at least account
for, entrenched practices and doctrine. Thus, habeas practice and
doctrinal developments after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment are relevant to discerning the contours of the constitutional claim. Such developments likewise support construing the
Fourteenth Amendment to extend the federal writ to state prisoners.
By the early part of this century, federal habeas had become an
important vehicle for vindicating the federal rights of state prisoners.
Soon after the Court's infamous denial of habeas relief to Leo Frank in
1915,232 the Court made the writ available to five African Americans
who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death after a race
riot in Arkansas. 233 As the Court extended various substantive guarantees of the Bill of Rights via the Due Process Clause, state prisoners
filed federal habeas petitions with increasing frequency and success. 234
In the landmark decision of Brown v. Allen, 235 the Court emphatically
asserted that the federal habeas statute, a codified version of the 1867
Act, authorized de novo review of all constitutional issues already addressed on their merits in state ·court. 236 To this day, federal habeas
affords state prisoners their sole meaningful opportunity for federal
review given the extraordinarily rare exercise of the Court's certiorari
jurisdiction over state criminal convictions.
At the same time, state habeas for state prisoners is generally of far
less signilicance to the preservation of federal rights. Although many
states permit prisoners to raise the full range of federal claims in
231. Fallon, supra note 7, at 1205 (citing W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56
PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN Socv. 167 (1956); Alasdair Macintyre, The Essential
Contestability of Some Social Concepts, 84 ETHICS 1 (1973)).
232. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (rejecting habeas claim based on allegation that
state murder trial was dominated by a mob and thereby denied petitioner due process of law).
233. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
234. See generally Peller, supra note 77, at 643-63 (connecting the increase in habeas
litigation with more expansive reading of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
235. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
236. 344 U.S. at 458 (state adjudication of federal constitutional claims does not bind a
federal habeas court through ordinary principles of res judicata).
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habeas, or postconviction,237 proceedings,2 38 others limit such proceedings to claims outside of the trial record that could not have been
pursued on direct appeal.2 39 Some states make no provision for counsel in postconviction proceedings, 240 even in capital cases. 24 1 Indeed,
state postconviction proceedings often are viewed as a necessary prelude to federal habeas litigation - to satisfy the statutory exhaustion
requirement242 - rather than as an independently viable means of vindicating federal rights.
Perhaps more importantly, the Supreme Court already has plainly
indicated in a series of decisions that states have no constitutional obligation to afford postconviction review. 243 In fact, the Court has never
called into question its decision from the late nineteenth century asserting that state criminal defendants have no constitutional right even
to appeal their convictions in state court. 244 In contrast, the Court has
suggested on several occasions that federal habeas for state prisoners
might find some constitutional protection via the Suspension
Clause,245 although the Court has never squarely addressed the issue.
Together these decisions suggest that the Court regards federal review
of federal issues as less intrusive than federally mandated structuring
237. The terms habeas and postconviction have become virtually synonymous in some state
schemes precisely because the writ has become primarily a means for challenging the lawfulness
of a conviction, rather than the lawfulness of a pretrial detention.
238. See LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES§ 1, at 3 (1981). The relatively
recent decision of many states to address the full panoply of federal claims is more fairly
attributable to states' desire to avoid intrusive federal habeas review than to states' desire to
ensure the full vindication of defendants' federal rights. See id.
239. Id. § 6, at 21. At the extreme, Arkansas has recently abolished state collateral review
of most federal claims. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 771 S.W.2d 266, 267 n.1 (Ark. 1989)
(limiting collateral review of state convictions to questions of whether the commitment is valid
on its face or whether the convicting court had proper jurisdiction).
240. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 31 n.28 (1989) (Stevens, J,, dissenting) (citing
states with no provision for postconviction counsel).
241. Murray, 492 U.S. at 10 n.5 (noting that, at the time of the decision, virtually half of the
states with the death penalty did not require automatic appointment of counsel in postconviction
proceedings).
242. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1988).
243. See, e.g., Murray, 492 U.S. at 10 ("State collateral proceedings are not constitutionally
required as an adjunct to the state criminal proceedings."); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551,
557 (1987) (holding that, because states have no obligation to provide a mechanism for
postconviction review, they are not required to supply counsel if they choose to adopt such
discretionary proceedings).
244. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
245. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1963) (suggesting that
constitutional issues might be implicated if the federal habeas statute were "construed to
derogate from the traditional liberality of the writ of habeas corpus"); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
406 (I 963) (suggesting that there are "some intimations of support for such a proposition in
decisions of this Court") (citing cases); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311 (1963) (stating that
the writ for state prisoners is "anchored in the ancient common law and in our Constitution as an
efficacious and imperative remedy for detentions of fundamental illegality").
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of state criminal justice systems. Accordingly, reconstructing the
Fourteenth Amendment habeas privilege as a right to federal rather
than state habeas fits more comfortably with both existing habeas
practice and constitutional doctrine.
2.

The Fourteenth Amendment's Protection Against ''Suspension"

If state prisoners are constitutionally entitled to federal habeas,
what is the scope of their entitlement? Recall Justice Harlan's suggestion that the constitutional protection for the writ must be understood
in light of the writ as it existed at the time of the Founding. 246 Following this approach, Justice Harlan, and later Chief Justice Burger,247
seemed to regard the Suspension Clause as establishing at most a right
to challenge the lawfulness of pretrial detentions. According to the
Chief Justice:
The sweep of the Suspension Clause must be measured by reference to
the intention of the Framers and their understanding of what the writ of
habeas corpus meant at the time the Constitution was drafted. . . . The
writ in 1789 was not considered "a means by which one court of general
jurisdiction exercises post-conviction review over the judgment of another court of like authority." 248

The problem with this approach is that it looks to the wrong
founding and to the wrong framers. The Suspension Clause alone cannot be read to afford state prisoners any federal habeas review. Such a
right is established only by reconstructing the Clause in light of the
Fourteenth Amendment. By the time of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the writ had already changed from a limited pretrial entitlement to a
more flexible remedy. 249 Indeed, the Supreme Court had already
granted relief on, or addressed, postconviction constitutional claims in
the exercise of its habeasjurisdiction.250 Accordingly, a purely historical approach cannot assign so limited a scope to the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of the writ.
On the other hand, historical and intentionalist arguments cer246. I must also protest the implication in the Court's opinion that every decision of this
Court in the field of habeas corpus ... has become enshrined in the Constitution because of
the guarantee in Article I against suspension of the writ. This matter may perhaps be
brought back into proper perspective by noting again that at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, and for many years afterward, a claim of the kind . . . asserted here by
petitioner, was not cognizable in habeas corpus at all.
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 29 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also supra note 8.
247. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
248. 430 U.S. at 384-85 (quoting Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court - Habeas
Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451, 451 (1966)).
249. See supra section I.B.2.
250. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (overturning criminal conviction
based on Sixth Amendment violation); supra section I.B.2.
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tainly do not establish the opposite - that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment equated habeas corpus with full postconviction review. That role for the writ was not firmly established until well
into this century. In the end, historical arguments must acknowledge
that the role of the writ by the time of Reconstruction was in a state of
transition. It had already shed much of its English common law heritage and yet had not fully assumed its current role of facilitating plenary postconviction review.
Nonetheless, one can make a strong case for interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment habeas right as a right to full postconviction
review of federal questions. From an intentionalist perspective, the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment likely regarded federal habeas
as an important part of a more comprehensive effort to ensure the
states' compliance with federal law. 251 The expansion of federal
habeas jurisdiction over state prisoners - first piecemeal in the Acts
of 1833 and 1842, and then wholesale in the Act of 1867 -was rooted
in the belief that the postconviction writ-of-error review would be insufficient to protect federal interests. 252 At a general level, then, federal habeas afforded a practical opportunity for federal review when
other avenues of review were unavailing.
Federal habeas for state prisoners in the post-Reconstruction years
confirmed the writ's role as an alternative means of securing federal
review. When state prisoners were able to challenge their convictions
through writ-of-error review in the Supreme Court, the federal courts
were generally unwilling to address postconviction errors on
habeas. 253 When writ-of-error review as of right was no longer available to state prisoners, federal habeas became the substitute mechanism for postconviction review of federal questions. 254 Thus, although
the scope of the writ has changed from predominantly pretrial to
predominantly post-trial review, it has done so to achieve the same
overriding purpose: to afford state prisoners a meaningful opportunity
to a federal forum for review of their federal claims.
Apart from intentionalism, casting the Fourteenth Amendment
251. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86; cf Liebman, supra note 73, at 2055-57.
252. See supra section I.B.3.
253. See Liebman, supra note 73, at 2070-71. Liebman persuasively demonstrates that "the
commensurability and substitutability of writ of error and habeas corpus review" is reflected by
the categories of cases in which the Court was willing to entertain federal habeas petitions of
state prisoners. According to Liebman, the Court regularly afforded habeas review if writ-oferror remedies were unavailable, if adherence to the exhaustion requirement would unduly delay
federal review, or if the state prisoner had become eligible for writ-of-error review while the
habeas petition was pending and administrative convenience justified addressing the habeas
petition in lieu of refiling. Id. at 2071 (collecting cases).
254. Id. at 2081-84.

February 1994]

Incorporating the Suspension Clause

911

habeas privilege as a right to postconviction review accords with the
Court's interpretation of the 1867 Habeas Act and current practice.
At least since 1953, the Court has understood the federal habeas statute to encompass de nova postconviction review of federal claims
brought by state prisoners.255 Accordingly, the federal courts have
continued to exercise habeas jurisdiction to provide state prisoners
with their one "appeal" as of right in the federal courts. 256 Just as the
right to trial by an "impartial jury" and the right to be free of "unreasonable searches and seizures" must take their meaning in light of contemporary understandings of those phrases, so should "habeas
corpus" be defined in light of the role it currently occupies in our federal structure. That firmly established role involves plenary postconviction review of certain federal issues, a role that mirrors in purpose,
although perhaps not in detail, the role that habeas occupied at the
time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
Which federal issues should such postconviction review entertain?
The most obvious answer is that the Fourteenth Amendment's habeas
right should be read to vindicate the other substantive rights protected
by that Amendment. Hence, the "incorporated" provisions of the Bill
of Rights, as well as any rights otherwise secured by the due process or
equal protection guarantees, should be enforceable against the states
through the federal writ. This construction carries forward the scope
of the 1867 Act, which authorized federal habeas review of any person
detained in violation of the Constitution. 257 It also comports with the
writ's long-standing role as a substitute for discretionary review by the
Supreme Court. Any theory that posits less than full review of all
constitutional issues must offer some basis for establishing a "hierarchy" of constitutional rights. 258 Moreover, such a theory must explain
why the hierarchy implicit in the Court's incorporation decisions applying some, but not all, of the privileges in the Bill of Rights
against the states - should be modified on federal habeas.
In sum, the Suspension Clause, viewed through the lens of the
Fourteenth Amendment, affords state prisoners a constitutional right
to federal review of constitutional claims in the lower federal courts.
Such a reading comports with the history surrounding the
Amendment's passage, gives life both to Article l's textual commit255. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S 443 (1953); supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
256. See Liebman, supra note 73, at 2009 (describing federal habeas as a form of appellate
review limited to federal claims).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 104-10.
258. See infra Part IV (discussing applications of the Fourteenth Amendment habeas right to
current limitations on federal habeas review).
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ment to the "privilege of the writ" and to the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of "privileges or immunities" of national citizenship, and accommodates current habeas practice and doctrine.
Before turning to the consequences that this asserted constitutional
right holds for currently enforced and proposed restrictions on the
availability of the federal writ, I will briefly address whether
Congress's apparent discretion to abolish the lower federal courts undermines recognition of a Fourteenth Amendment right to federal
habeas.
C.

The Article III Objection

One important obstacle to recognizing a constitutional right to federal habeas review is the familiar proposition that lower federal court
jurisdiction is entirely discretionary. Article III vests the judicial
power of the United States "in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. "259 This text, together with the records of the Constitutional
Convention, 260 provide overwhelming support for the widely embraced view that Article III does not require the creation of lower
federal courts. 261 If Congress were not obligated to create lower federal courts, a constitutional right to federal habeas, presumably in the
Supreme Court alone, would be of virtually no value; federal habeas
review is important precisely because the Supreme Court is unable, as
a practical matter, to grant certiorari in the thousands of state criminal cases raising federal questions on direct review. 262 Indeed, Justice
Scalia has recently urged a narrow reading of the habeas statute on
this very premise: "It would be a strange constitution that regards
state courts as second-rate instruments for the vindication of federal
rights and yet makes no mandatory provision for lower federal courts
(as our Constitution does not)."263
I do not dispute the conventional reading of Article III. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that the Fourteenth Amendment
was not passed contemporaneously with Article III. By 1868, the
lower federal courts had been in place for over seventy-five years, since
the beginning of the nation. Their jurisdiction had been substantially
259. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
260. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 99, at 11 ("[I)t seems to be a necessary inference
•.. that the creation of inferior federal courts was to rest in the discretion of Congress [and] that
the scope of their jurisdiction, once created, was also to be discretionary.").
261. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (arguing that the Habeas Act of 1867 was
enacted in part to make federal review of federal questions practically available).
263. Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1770 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
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enlarged through removal statutes and the Habeas Act of 1867.264
For the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the discretionary
character of the lower federal courts was of mere hypothetical interest
because a federal judiciary consisting solely of the Supreme Court was
already unimaginable.
Hence, if the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to
guarantee meaningful federal review of federal claims through habeas
corpus in the lower courts, they would not have paused to consider
whether such a right could be woven comfortably into a federal
judicial regime that had no lower courts. Of course, I have asserted
that such a specific intention cannot be attributed to the framers. 265 If,
though, conventional forms of constitutional argument suggest this
same result - that the Fourteenth Amendment is best read to afford
state prisoners federal habeas in the lower federal courts - we should
not resist this otherwise sensible or plausible reading of the
Amendment based on concerns that the framers would have rejected
out of hand.
In any case, we should not forget that the Fourteenth Amendment
amends the Constitution. If the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be
effectuated without the aid of the lower federal courts, we should resolve the apparent conflict between Article III and the Fourteenth
Amendment in favor of the subsequent enactment. We should certainly be cautious before we conclude that a constitutional amendment
implicitly overrides a textually demonstrable commitment in the original Constitution. We should not assume, though, that the framers of
constitutional amendments have the controversies of an earlier day as
clearly in mind as their more pressing concerns, especially if such controversies appear to be fully settled by practice if not by decision.
IV.

APPLYING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO CURRENT
CONTROVERSIES: WHAT CONSTITUTES A SUSPENSION OF
THE WRIT?

If the Court were to recognize the Fourteenth Amendment habeas
right described in this article, how would such a right affect current
disputes about the appropriate scope of the writ? This Part evaluates
the Court's various procedural and substantive habeas doctrines, as
264. Supra section I.B.3; see Habeas Corpus Act, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 755, 756-57 (1863)
(providing for removal to the lower federal courts under specified circumstances); Judiciary Act,
ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86 (1867) (authorizing broad federal habeas review by the lower
federal courts).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 229-30.

914

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 92:862

well as congressional proposals for reform, from a constitutional
perspective.
Ironically, none of the stringent procedural doctrines that initially
prompted the Warren Court to invoke the Suspension Clause266 raises
any serious constitutional difficulties. The "cause and prejudice" standard governing habeas treatment of claims forfeited in state court,
new-claim successive petitions, 267 and same-claim successive petitions268 affords state prisoners a constitutionally adequate opportunity
for federal review of federal claims. On the other hand, several of the
Court's recent doctrines - including the withdrawal of habeas review
of Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims, 269 the requirement
that habeas petitioners show greater harm stemming from constitutional violations than defendants challenging their convictions on direct review, 270 and the general bar to retroactive application of "new"
law on habeas 271 - present closer cases. The often-floated proposal to
confine federal habeas review to the adequacy of the state corrective
processes272 likewise triggers serious constitutional scrutiny.
A.

Procedural Obstacles to Federal Habeas Relief

1. Federal Habeas Treatment of State Forfeitures
One of the most contested issues in federal habeas law concerns the
treatment of federal claims that are procedurally defaulted in state
court. If the state procedural default is "independent and adequate,"
Article III of the Constitution bars consideration of the federal claim
266. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1963) (suggesting that stringent
treatment of same-claim or new-claim successive petitions might violate the Suspension Clause);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963) (raising, but not addressing, the possibility that the
Constitution might require liberal treatment of federal claims procedurally forfeited in state
court).
267. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991) (holding that "cause and
prejudice" standard rather than "deliberate bypass" standard governs habeas treatment of claims
procedurally defaulted in state court).
268. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518 (1992) (suggesting that the "cause and
prejudice" standard of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), governs habeas treatment of
same-claim successive petitions).
269. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that state prisoners may not ordinarily
seek habeas relief on the ground that unconstitutionally seized evidence was erroneously
introduced at trial).
270. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
271. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305-10 (1989) (plurality opinion) (narrowing
retroactive application of new constitutional decisions on federal habeas).
272. See, e.g., S. 1241, 102d Cong., !st Sess. § 1105 (1991) (proposing to eliminate habeas
review of issues where claimant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate such claims in state
court); S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1982) (likewise advocating "full and fair" standard); see
also Bator, supra note 73, at 527-28 (suggesting that federal habeas review should be modified to
afford federal judges discretion to deny relief where the constitutional issue "has been fully
canvassed by fair state process").
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on direct review. 273 The Article III bar rests on the generally applicable principle that federal review of cases involving nondiverse parties is
confined to issues arising under federal law. 274 Nonetheless, in Fay v.
Noia, 2 1 5 the Court held that a discretionary, nonjurisdictional standard - "deliberate bypass" - controlled the effect of state forfeitures
on federal habeas. 276 Indeed, in Noia, the Court suggested that the
Suspension Clause may compel its nonjurisdictional treatment of state
procedural defaults. 2 11
In a series of decisions over the past sixteen years, the Court has
overruled Noia and replaced the "deliberate bypass" test with a "cause
and prejudice" standard. 278 Instead of focusing on whether the defendant intentionally relinquished his right to raise a constitutional
claim, 279 the latter test asks whether some unusual or extraordinary
external impediment prevented the defendant from adhering to state
procedural rules. 280 As a result, federal habeas treatment of state forfeitures has become virtually equivalent to the Court's treatment of
such forfeitures on direct review, 281 although it still remains somewhat
more generous given the flat jurisdictional bar imposed by Article Ill.
The Court's overruling of Noia does not plausibly deny state prisoners the Fourteenth Amendment habeas right identified above. The
various arguments supporting a constitutional right to federal habeas
review emphasize that such review affords state prisoners meaningful
access to a federal forum in lieu of the Supreme Court's wholly discretionary certiorari jurisdiction.282 The purpose underlying such a right
273. See, e.g., Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) (defendant's failure to object to
grand jury composition prior to entry of guilty plea, as required by state rule, bars Supreme
Court review of federal claim); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (state rule precluding
reconsideration of federal issue adjudicated in prior litigation bars Supreme Court review).
274. See, e.g., Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875) (developing
independent and adequate state grounds doctrine).
275. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
276. 372 U.S. at 433-34.
277. 372 U.S. at 405-06.
278. See Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991) (finding no "cause" for default
based on attorney's failure to file an appeal and explicitly overruling Noia); Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478 (1986) (finding no "cause" for default based on attorney's failure to preserve a claim
on appeal); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (finding no "cause" for default based on
attorney's failure to recognize the basis for petitioner's constitutional claim); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (applying "cause and prejudice" standard to trial default); Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (refusing to address grand jury exclusion claim absent a showing of
cause and prejudice), vacated, 425 U.S. 967 (1976).
279. Noia, 372 U.S. at 439 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
280. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991).
281. See Jordan M. Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REV. 303, 322-37
(1993) (tracing the Court's procedural default doctrine and evaluating its impact).
282. See supra section III.B (exploring contours of Fourteenth Amendment habeas right).
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is to guarantee a federal forum for federal claims, not to override legitimate applications of state law. Conceived in this way, the review afforded on federal habeas need not be more generous than the Court's
direct review. 283 Indeed, Justice Brennan's opinion in Noia did not
persuasively explain why the Article III bar did not apply with equal
force to federal habeas proceedings. 284 If a state decision truly rests on
independent and adequate state grounds, and such grounds are not
invoked merely to frustrate the enforcement of federal law, there is
little in the Fourteenth Amendment that would require overriding the
state basis of decision. Thus, if anything, the constitutional argument
against adoption of a nonjurisdictional procedural default standard is
stronger than the claim that such a solicitous standard is constitutionally mandated.
2. Federal Habeas Treatment of Successive Petitions
At the same time that the Court adopted a generous procedural
default standard, it construed the habeas statute to permit petitioners
to file successive habeas petitions except in narrow circumstances. 285
Congress subsequently amended the statute, 286 apparently to codify
the Court's standard. 287 Nonetheless, the Court ultimately held that
lower federal courts may not entertain same-claim288 or new-claim 289
successive petitions unless the petitioner demonstrates "cause and
prejudice" or makes a colorable showing of actual innocence. 290 This
283. See Herbert Wechsler, Habeas Corpus and the Supreme Court: Reconsidering the Reach
of the Great Writ, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 179 (1988) (arguing that "it surely is astounding
that in the course of only forty years the reach of habeas in the review of state criminal
convictions should have been expanded to the point where, in cases involving a procedural
default, it became broader than federal direct review").
284. See Steiker, supra note 281, at 324-25.
285. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963) (holding that a petitioner abuses the writ
if he deliberately withholds a claim at the time of his first application or if the purpose of the
subsequent filing is to vex, harass, or delay).
286. [A] subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus ... need not be entertained .••
unless the application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated
on the hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the court •.. is satisfied that
the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted
ground or otherwise abused the writ.
28 u.s.c. § 2244(b) (1988).
287. See Steiker, supra note 281, at 348 n. 213 ("'The statute has been correctly understood
as an enactment into law of the principles announced in Sanders.' " (quoting 17A CHARLES A.
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 4267, at 478 (2d ed. 1988))).
288. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that
petitioner must make a colorable showing of actual innocence to overcome bar to same-claim
successive petitions).
289. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991) (holding that new-claim successive petitions
are subject to cause and prejudice standard).
290. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518 (1992) (outlining Court's doctrinal approach
to same-claim and new-claim successive petitions).
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approach to successive petitions, like the Court's approach to procedural default, has substantially decreased the likelihood that federal
habeas courts will address the merits of state prisoners' federal claims.
Do the newly adopted limitations on successive filings run afoul of
the Fourteenth Amendment habeas right? The case for such a constitutional claim is quite thin. Perpetual federal review of federal claims
is not essential to the enforcement of federal law. Brown v. Allen 291
notwithstanding, the Fourteenth Amendment should not be read to
override principles of res judicata when a federal court has already
addressed the merits of a federal claim. Nor should the Fourteenth
Amendment's concern for the vindication of federal rights preclude
Congress from requiring that all federal claims be presented at the
same time as a means of protecting both the states' interest in finality
of judgments and the federal interest in conserving judicial resources.
The absence of a viable constitutional claim, though, does not suggest that a more generous successive petition policy is unwise as a matter of policy. Federal habeas petitions are often filed without the
benefit of adequate legal counsel. Moreover, the facts underlying some
constitutional claims are often concealed by the very state actors
whose conduct those claims challenge. 292 These considerations could
lead Congress to adopt a more flexible standard than the Court's current approach to same-claim and new-claim successive petitions. Indeed, there is a strong case that Congress has already done so and that
the Court's decisions reflect a poor interpretation of the habeas statute. 293 But neither the policy considerations supporting broad successive habeas review nor the purportedly unfaithful interpretation by the
Court transforms the concern for successive federal litigation into a
constitutional entitlement.
That the Court raised the specter of the Suspension Clause in both
the procedural default and successive petition contexts2 9 4 reflects the
same misunderstanding of the constitutional source of federal habeas
for state prisoners that accounts for the abandonment of the constitutional argument altogether. Justice Brennan, like Justice Harlan and
Chief Justice Burger, 295 located the right to federal habeas for state
prisoners in the Suspension Clause alone. Accordingly, he sought to
291. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
292. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1487 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that state officials affirmatively misled petitioner's counsel about the facts underlying the
claim presented in petitioner's new-claim successive petition).
293. See supra note 287.
294. See supra note 266.
295. See supra note 8.
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assign the same meaning to "suspension" that the term had at the
Founding of the original Constitution. At that time, as Justice Harlan
was quick to note in his Sanders dissent, 296 nonsuspension was essentially a command that the courts keep their doors open to review
claims of unlawful extrajudicial and pretrial detentions. Justice
Brennan invoked the same image in a radically different context: federal courts must never shut their doors to constitutional claims
brought by state prisoners, even if they have already been convicted
and, indeed, even after they have already litigated their claims in federal court.
The difficulty with Justice Brennan's approach is that it does not
attempt to analyze the scope of the habeas right in light of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Once the habeas right is conceived as a
means of postconviction challenge, the notion that it should be perpetual must be abandoned. As I have argued above,2 97 a more sensible
understanding of the guarantee against "suspension" is that it obligates Congress to provide one meaningful, nondiscretionary opportunity to secure federal review of federal claims. Such a reading more
faithfully accords with the function of habeas both at the time of the
"true" founding - 1868 - and throughout this century.
B. Substantive Restrictions on the Writ
1.

Constitutional Hierarchy? Federal Habeas Treatment of Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule Claims

By the late 1960s, as a result of the Court's solicitous habeas standards and dramatic incorporation decisions, federal habeas for state
prisoners had become an increasingly important means of enforcing
federal rights. Federal habeas had also become a source of heightened
tension in federal-state relations, as federal courts more regularly reversed the convictions of state prisoners on what were often perceived
to be "technical" grounds. Several Justices, following the advice of
Judge Friendly,298 argued that federal habeas should serve a more limited function than direct review and, more particularly, that factual
innocence should be an important consideration in deciding whether
to afford habeas relief. 299
296. 373 U.S. at 29 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
297. See supra section 111.B.2.
298. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgme/l/s,
38 u. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970).
299. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J,, concurring)
(arguing that collateral review of search-and-seizure claims should be confined "solely to the
question of whether the petitioner was provided a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated
the question in state courts").
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The Court ultimately embraced one substantive limitation on the
writ on the basis of these concerns. In Stone v. Powel/, 300 the Court
held that state prisoners may not ordinarily seek habeas relief on the
ground that unconstitutionally seized evidence was erroneously introduced at trial. 301 According to the Court, the benefits of collateral
enforcement of the exclusionary rule do not justify the costs in terms
of loss of finality, intrusion on state criminal processes, and depletion
of judicial resources. Thus, while the Court continued to adhere to its
decision to apply the exclusionary rule on direct review of state criminal convictions, 302 it held that state prisoners could not raise such
claims on federal habeas unless they were denied a fair opportunity to
litigate their claims in state court.
In the Court's view, its decision to withhold habeas review of
Fourth Amendment claims reflected a refinement of the exclusionary
rule rather than a rejection of the principle and statutory command
that all constitutional claims should be cognizable on federal
habeas. 303 Nonetheless, Powell is better read as a limitation on habeas
than as a gloss on the exclusionary rule. 304 Powell does not retreat
from the Court's position that the exclusionary rule must be applied in
state proceedings. Accordingly, a defendant convicted and imprisoned on the basis of illegally seized evidence is detained in violation of
the Constitution; the state, by refusing to exclude the evidence, misapplied federal constitutional law.
Whether a federal court will review such an unconstitutional detention is a separate matter. According to Powel/, state law enforcement officers who might otherwise flout the Fourth Amendment will
be deterred adequately by the possibility that the state courts will exclude the illegally seized evidence, together with the remote possibility
of review by the Supreme Court. This conception of constitutional
norm enforcement violates the Fourteenth Amendment habeas right.
Powell assumes that state courts will be sufficiently receptive to constitutional claims so that federal review will not be necessary to secure
compliance with federal law. Even if this assumption was currently
warranted as an empirical matter, it is inconsistent with the fundamental structural principles animating the 1867 Habeas Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment.
300. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
301. 428 U.S. at 481-82.
302. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
303. 428 U.S. at 494-95 n.37 (insisting that its decision was "not concerned with the scope of
the habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims generally").
304. I defend this argument more fully in Steiker, supra note 281, at 362-63.
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As I have argued above, 305 textual and doctrinal considerations require the Fourteenth Amendment habeas right to be defined in some
manner. Given the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the historical role of the writ in this
country, the most plausible construction connects the Fourteenth
Amendment habeas right to the goal of federal supremacy. However,
if Powell is accepted on its terms such that federal and state courts are
regarded as interchangeable vehicles for the enforcement of federal
law, this aspect of the writ is lost. Powell's central assumption of parity thereby frustrates the effort to define the habeas right located in the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Powell, however, might be cast more narrowly. Rather than disclaiming the importance of federal review generally, we might regard
Powell as defining which rights are sufficiently important to warrant
federal protection. On this view, the exclusionary rule is not designed
to vindicate claims of individual liberty so much as to encourage compliance with the Fourth Amendment for the benefit of society as a
whole. As the Court reiterated in Powell, "the rule is a judicially created remedy" 306 rather than "a personal constitutional right. " 307
Hence, federal courts need not be enlisted in the effort to police Fourth
Amendment violations.
This approach, too, runs counter to the Fourteenth Amendment.
If a provision of the Bill of Rights is sufficiently rooted in our traditions and constitutional text to command application against the states
via the Due Process Clause, there is little basis for concluding that it is
not sufficiently important to justify federal enforcement. Nor is there
a textual basis in the 1867 Habeas Act or in the Fourteenth
Amendment for establishing a hierarchy of constitutional rights. Ultimately, the selective withdrawal of issues from federal habeas review
based on the Court's own policy assessment of the values associated
with particular constitutional provisions cannot be defended. In any
event, the Court has chosen to confine Powell to the Fourth
Amendment context and has refused to bar habeas relitigation of
grand jury discrimination claims308 or claims alleging Miranda
violations. 309
305. See supra Parts II, III.
306. 428 U.S. at 486 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
307. 428 U.S. at 486.
308. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
309. Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993) (sustaining habeas review of claims
alleging noncompliance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
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The Nonretroactivity Principle

The most noted recent change in habeas law concerns the retroac'tivity of constitutional decisions. During the same Term in which the
Court decided Noia and Sanders, the Court suggested for the first time
in Linkletter v. Walker310 that criminal defendants need not invariably
receive the retroactive benefit of new constitutional rules. Instead, the
Court held that the retroactivity of new decisions should be determined in light of the purposes of the new rule, the reliance interests
surrounding the old rule, and the administrative effects of retroactive
application. 311 Applying this test, the Court held that the petitioner
could not receive the retroactive benefit of the Court's then-recent decision to apply the exclusionary rule against the states. 312
In its early applications of the nonretroactivity doctrine, the Court
did not distinguish between claims raised on direct review and those
raised on federal habeas. 313 But, in response to a series of separate
opinions by Justice Harlan, 314 the Court subsequently held that criminal defendants must receive the full retroactive benefit of new constitutional decisions on direct review. 315 More recently, and more
controversially, the Court adopted the corollary of Justice Harlan's
approach, 316 ruling that federal habeas petitioners cannot ordinarily
receive the retroactive benefit of new constitutional decisions. 317
Under the Court's new approach, retroactive application of new law
on habeas is limited to rules that prohibit the criminalization of certain
310. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
311. 381 U.S. at 636.
312. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
313. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1967) (rejecting as "unsupportable"
any distinction between direct and collateral review in deciding the scope of its decisions
regarding the admissibility of pretrial identifications made in the absence of counsel).
314. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In
Justice Harlan's view, full retroactive application of new constitutional rules was a necessary
aspect of the Court's judicial power to exercise direct review over the decisions of lower federal
and state courts: "If we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of our best
understanding of governing principles, it is difficult to see why we should adjudicate any case at
all." Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679. At the same time, Justice Harlan suggested that retroactive
application of new law on federal habeas should be quite narrow. See, e.g., Desist, 394 U.S. at
262 (arguing that retroactive application of new decisions on habeas should be confined to "those
rules which substantially affect the fact-finding apparatus of the original trial"); Mackey, 401
U.S. at 692-93 (refining his position in Desist such that retroactive application of new decisions
on federal habeas should encompass rules that place "certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe" or rules that
mandate protections " 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' " (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))).
315. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
316. See supra note 314.
317. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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kinds of conduct and "watershed" rules that diminish the likelihood
that the innocent will be convicted. 31 8
Given that the Fourteenth Amendment habeas right is properly
regarded as a substitute for the Court's discretionary certiorari review
of federal claims, a general principle of nonretroactivity on federal
habeas is unobjectionable from a constitutional perspective. By authorizing the lower federal courts to resolve a petitioner's claims in
light of the law prevailing at the time the conviction became final, the
nonretroactivity principle places the petitioner in precisely the same
position he would have occupied had the Supreme Court chosen to
grant certiorari review.319
Nonetheless, the Court's applications of its nonretroactivity principle suggest that it has done more than simply restore parity between
direct and habeas review. Indeed, the Court's expansive conception of
"new" law has threatened to undermine lower federal courts' ability to
apply established principles to novel fact patterns. 320 Moreover, the
rhetoric surrounding the Court's retroactivity decisions has not highlighted the case for parity between habeas and direct review so much
as it has emphasized the respect and deference owed state judges. 321
Thus, if the Court genuinely employs its nonretroactivity doctrine to
harmonize direct and habeas review, it will secure precisely the role
for the writ required as a minimum by the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Suspension Clause. If, on the other hand, the retroactivity
doctrine becomes a vehicle for stifling routine habeas application of
law to facts, the doctrine may ultimately undermine - and at some
point unconstitutionally "suspend" - state prisoners' access to meaningful federal review.
C.

Confining Habeas Review to the Adequacy of State Procedures

Over the past thirty years, Professor Paul Bator's "full and fair" or
318. 489 U.S. at 307, 311.
319. See Liebman, supra note 73, at 2007 (arguing that "the nonretroactivity bar actually
preserves parity between direct and habeas corpus review").
320. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) (holding that the decision in Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), condemning prosecutorial argument that sought to diminish
the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict was novel, despite the fact that such comments
had been condemned in prior cases as potentially violative of the Due Process Clause, see
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990)
(holding that the rule prohibiting police-initiated interrogation concerning a separate offense in
the absence of counsel, see Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), was novel notwithstanding
an earlier decision that had addressed a virtually identical Fifth Amendment violation. See
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)).
321. See, e.g., Saffie v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) ("'The 'new rule' principle therefore
validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even
though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.'" (quoting Butler, 494 U.S. at 414)),
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"process" model of habeas review322 has been the primary foil to the
full relitigation model embraced by Brown v. Allen. 323 Bator maintained that federal habeas review should be confined to the adequacy
of the state procedures for correcting federal error. Such a model, in
Bator's view, avoids the high costs of revisiting issues already addressed in a judicial forum and recognizes the futility of seeking unassailably "correct" outcomes to legal disputes. 324 Bator's approach
accounts in part for the Court's current bar to Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule claims. 325 It also has provided the framework for
congressional proposals that generally would foreclose relitigation of
federal issues on federal habeas. 326
Bator's approach cannot be squared with the Fourteenth
Amendment habeas right outlined in this Part. If Bator's proposal
were implemented, courts would generally deny state prisoners access
to federal review of federal claims. Although the Fourteenth
Amendment does not command "correct" legal outcomes, it does
command that federal courts have the last say regarding the content of
federal rights. In this regard, it is important to note that Bator's argument rested primarily on general institutional considerations and policy considerations. 327 Relying on the familiar proposition that the
existence of the lower federal courts is entirely a matter of congressional discretion, he did not take seriously the possibility that the
Constitution speaks at all to the scope of the federal habeas right. 328
Once the constitutional argument is uncovered, though, the underlying assumption of parity between federal and state courts on which
Bator's theory rests must be critically reexamined. 329
322. See Bator, supra note 73, at 456.
323. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
324. Bator, supra note 73, at 446-47.
325. See supra section IV.B.1. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court held that:
[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth
Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal
habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his trial.
428 U.S. at 481-82 (footnote omitted).
326. See supra note 272 (citing statutes).
327. Bator, supra note 73, at 446 (beginning his discussion with an open-ended consideration
of "the problem of finality as it bears on the great task of creating rational institutional schemes
for the administration of the criminal law").
328. Surely it is plain that there exists no constitutional right to have the merits of a federal
question determined by a federal constitutional court; this would seem to be implicit in the
power of the Congress over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and over the
very existence of lower federal courts.
Id. at 507 (footnote omitted).
329. Id. at 511-12 (rejecting institutional arguments regarding state hostility to federal rights
and the purported superiority of the federal courts).
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CONCLUSION

Over the past thirty years, legislators, judges, academics, and the
general community have engaged in a robust debate about the proper
scope of federal habeas review for state prisoners. During virtually
every session Congress considers proposals for habeas reform, and
every term the Supreme Court adds to its "common law" rules governing the availability of the writ. As might be expected, these legislative and judicial developments inspire an extraordinary amount of
legal scholarship.
Strikingly absent from these deliberations is any mention of the
Constitution. At a time when debates about "incorporation" are becoming increasingly anachronistic, it is time to revisit the Fourteenth
Amendment's effect on the "original" Constitution and Bill of Rights
with an eye toward habeas corpus. After all, the various substantive
rights that already have been incorporated are only as valuable as the
remedial structures available for their enforcement. Moreover, the
Suspension Clause stands as a conspicuous exception to the general
observation that the Constitution makes no references to remedies. 330
Once we examine the Suspension Clause through the lens of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the right to habeas corpus embodied in the
Clause assumes quite different dimensions. We can no longer assume
that the scope of the constitutional protection corresponds to the
scope of the writ in 1789. Nor can we assume that the writ protected
is the federal writ for federal prisoners. Ultimately, we must reconstruct the constitutional right against "suspension" in light of the
unique role that habeas occupied prior to the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment and in accordance with contemporary practice and doctrine.
I have defined this reconstructed writ as a right of state prisoners
to federal review of federal claims. This interpretation is faithful to
the general understanding of the writ's role by 1868 and carries forward to a contemporary setting the structural concerns embedded in
the Habeas Act of 1867. Whether or not we embrace this particular
reconstruction, it is important to reintroduce constitutional argument
to the debates surrounding habeas corpus. The "Great Writ" deserves
its appellation not merely because of its remarkable role in English
history and our own. Its greatness also stems from its enshrinement in
our Constitution.

330. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 8, at 1779 (citing the Takings Clause as the other
exception).

